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I. INTRODUCTION
Amidst fears that a candidate for public office could be bought for the
price of an average-quality digital television, Vermont's legislature enacted
Act 64.1 However, the price tag was set below an acceptable retail value. In
fact, the Act anticipated that candidates would sell for record-low, red-tag
amounts.2 The Supreme Court rejected the State's contention that higher
campaign contribution levels would result in an electoral clearance sale, and
reasserted that campaign finance limitations have a constitutional "lower
bound."3 In doing so, it declined to answer the calls of critics-from inside
the judiciary and out-to refashion the structure of its campaign finance

jurisprudence.4
Largely adhered to for more than thirty years, the framework established
in Buckley v. Valeo5 has been treated by some as "superprecedent" -and by
others as flawed.6 A direct and deliberate provocation to the latter, Act 64

1. Vermont's Public Act No. 64, codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801-2883 (2002) ("Act
64" or "the Act"), took effect immediately following the 1998 elections. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S.
Ct. 2479, 2486 (2006) (plurality opinion). On a broad level, Act 64 imposed two stringent
limitations on campaign money. Id. at 2485. First, among other expenditure restrictions, candidates
for public office could exhaust only specified, maximum amounts during any "two-year general
election cycle." See id. at 2486 (holding the Act's staggered expenditure limits violative of the First
Amendment by adhering to thirty years of cases doing the same). Second, individuals were
permitted to contribute only set, minimal amounts to political parties and campaigns for state office.
See id. (holding the Act's contribution limits unconstitutional by judicially determining how much is
too much to give candidates before a bona fide risk of corruption arises). Act 64 subjected
individuals, political committees, and political parties to identical contribution limits, and did not
index any of these provisions for inflation. Id.; see also Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459,
464-73 (D. Vt. 2000); see generally Bryan R. Whittaker, Note, A Legislative Strategy Conditioned
on Corruption: Regulating Campaign Financingafter McConnell v. FEC, 79 IND, L.J. 1063 (2004)
(discussing in detail the risk of corruption and its repeated assertion as a governmental interest in
campaign finance cases). But cf Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 425 (2000)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that he "cannot fathom how a $251 contribution could pose a
substantial risk of 'secur[ing] a political quid pro quo' (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26
(1976)) (alteration in original)).
2. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805(a)-(b) (1997) (limiting contributions to candidates
for Vermont office in a two-year election cycle to $200 for state representative, to $300 for state
senator, and to $400 for governor and other key statewide positions).
3. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2492 (plurality opinion) (finding Act 64's contribution limits
unconstitutionally low and asserting that "limits that are too low can [] harm the electoral process by
preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby
reducing democratic accountability"). The Court prefaced this assertion with the acknowledgment
that Vermont's "legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as legislators have
'particular expertise' in matters related to the costs and nature of running for office." Id. (citing
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93* 137 (2003)). However, as this Note will address, the Court fails to
articulate any sort of a precise mathematical formula for determining how low is too low. On the
other hand, Justice Breyer provides lower courts with a well-delineated, five-factor approach, which
may or may not prove useful for guidance-thirsty judges. See id. at 2495-99.
4. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REv. 311
(1998) (arguing the inadequacies of campaign finance restrictions and proposing some alternatives).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
6. A case eligible for "superprecedent" status generally has, for a protracted period of time,
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was enacted in 1997 by proponents who embraced the unavoidable attack
brought by politicians, and the inevitable return of campaign finance reform
to the Nation's highest court.7 But a plurality of justices declined to take the
bait.8 Rather, Buckley provided the central basis upon which the Court
found the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations unconstitutional. 9
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall
make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . ."'0 Campaign finance cases,
both before and after Randall, contemplate a balance between First
Amendment protections and the need to thwart the corruption that
potentially follows large sums of money." Indeed, the rights of free speech2
and political expression are inextricably intertwined in the electoral setting.
averted potential legal disputes and persuaded out-of-court settlement. See Allison R. Hayward, The
Per Curiam Opinion of Steel: Buckley v. Valeo as Superprecedent? Clues from Wisconsin and
Vermont, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 195, 202-03 (arguing that Buckley is not a good case for
superprecedent status because it has not prevented legal disputes or encouraged the early resolution
thereof). Given Buckley's thirty-year survival record, it seems that many Justices of the Court
believe it is worthy of the label. See Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2488-90 (plurality opinion) (recognizing
that "[o]ver the last [thirty] years, in considering the constitutionality of a host of different campaign
finance statutes, this Court has repeatedly adhered to Buckley's constraints," that "Buckley has
promoted considerable reliance," and that "[o]verruling Buckley now would dramatically undermine
this reliance on our settled precedent"). However, Hayward believes that allowing Buckley to be
unassailable is a mistake of constitutional magnitude, as it has "[n]either ...prevented legal disputes
from arising nor encouraged them to be settled without litigation." Hayward, supra, at 202. She
criticizes the long-standing reliance placed on the decision's use of dual levels of scrutiny. Id. at
209.
7. See Memorandum from Deborah L. Markowitz, Vt. Sec'y of State, to Senate Gov't
Operations/House Local Gov't Comms. (Jan. 9, 2001) (asserting that some of Act 64's
provisions were enacted with the "express legislative goal of giving the Supreme Court
an opportunity to re-evaluate its decision in Buckley v. Valeo"), available at http://vermontelections.org/electionsl/2001 GAMemoCF.html.
8. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2489-91 (plurality opinion); see also 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 16:14.60 (2006) ("Randall v. Sorrell plainly

indicates growing unrest on the Supreme Court with Buckley, but no clear five-Justice majority
ready to overturn it.").
9. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2487-88, 2490-92 (plurality opinion).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
11. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-25, 55 (1976) (per curiam); Cal. Med. Ass'n v.
FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 193-94 (1981) (plurality opinion) (no violation of the First Amendment); FEC v.
Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm. (NPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (violation of First
Amendment); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 251 (1986) (violation of
First Amendment as applied to non-profit organization); Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491 (plurality
opinion) (two-fold violation of First Amendment); Citizens for Clean Gov't v. City of San Diego,
474 F.3d 647, 649-52 (9th Cir. 2007) (violation of First Amendment in context of signaturegathering phase of recall election).
12. During oral arguments in Randall v. Sorrell on February 28, 2006, Justice Scalia opined:
"[Y]ou're not talking about money here. You're talking about speech. So long as all that money is
going to campaigning, you're talking about speech. And when you say you don't need any more

At the same time however, a constitutional democracy cannot long absorb
the effects of political scandals and the expense of the campaigns that
initiate them, and the result is that the Supreme Court has essentially

bifurcated

its

approach

to

campaign

contributions

and

campaign

It articulates-or, arguably, fails to articulate-dual
expenditures. 3
standards. 14 Then in its application of these standards, the Court-largely

unqualified to assert how much money is enough to run an effective
campaign (and how much is too much)-engages in a numbers game
somewhat resembling casino roulette.' 5
The judicially-crafted dichotomy imposed upon political money seems,
at first glance, relatively straightforward: campaign contributions are
properly the subject of governmental supervision while campaign spending
is not. 16 However, the scheme diverges here, and the branches are subject to
differing constitutional standards.' 7 In Buckley and in later cases, the Court

lays down an exacting standard, obscurely communicated but strongly

speech than this, that's a very odd thing for . . a United States government to say." Transcript of
Oral Argument at 50, Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (No. 04-1528), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/04-1528.pdf.
The Justice
further observed that when the government "will tell you how much campaigning is enough,"
"[t]hat's extraordinary." Id. at 52; cf Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Proceeding from the maxim that 'money talks,' the Court finds that the
expenditure limitations will seriously curtail political expression by candidates and interfere
substantially with their chances for election.").
13. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (distinguishing between expenditure and contribution
limitations and applying different standards of scrutiny to each).
14. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REv. 283, 283 (2006)
[hereinafter Supreme Court 2005] (indicating that the reaction to Buckley was "almost universally
negative"). Buckley is certainly the largest factor contributing to today's general confusion about the
appropriate framework to be applied to campaign finance legislation. Id. Randall brings additional
uncertainty to this already misguided jurisprudence-or, in the very least, it does nothing to clarify
the situation. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. 2485-500 (plurality opinion). It essentially affirmed Buckley,
and endorsed the general acceptance of contribution limitations and the prohibition of expenditure
regulations. See id.
15. As will be discussed later, the plurality seems to arbitrarily distinguish Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PA C, which upheld the limit of $1,075 on contributions to candidates for state
auditor, from the $200 per election per candidate limit in Randall. See Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2494
(plurality opinion); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). Justice Breyer
recognizes that Vermont's population is much smaller than Missouri's, and thus Act 64's amount per
constituent is actually more; he then hastily asserts that "this does not necessarily mean that
Vermont's limits are less objectionable than the limit upheld in Shrink." Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2494
(plurality opinion). At the same time however, this does not mean that Act 64's limits are any more
objectionable. Secondly, this is a feeble attempt to provide concrete guidance to inferior courts. See
id. at 2503 (Thomas, J., concurring only in the judgment) (criticizing the plurality's use of Shrink
Missouri as a factor in its analysis of Act 64's contribution limitations). Indeed, this is a ripe setting
for the inconsistency that inevitably ensues when lower court judges are forced to take a gamble.
16. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23; see also Supreme Court 2005, supra note 14, at 283.
17. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134 (2003) (recognizing that restrictions on campaign
expenditures are generally subject to closer scrutiny than restrictions on contributions); see also
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (drawing a line between contribution and expenditure limits, and treating the
former as direct restraints on speech subject to some higher level of scrutiny).
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reminiscent of strict scrutiny, to be applied to expenditure limitations.18
Alternatively, restraints on monetary contributions face a "less rigorous
standard," one which requires only that the limits are "closely drawn to
match a sufficiently important [governmental] interest."1 9 It is in this

context that the risk of corruption and other justifications tip the balance in
favor of permissible regulation.2 °

To appreciate the basis of the above distinction, one must perform a
modest amount of mental gymnastics. Essentially, restrictions on campaign
expenditures unduly limit First Amendment free speech interests because

they directly and necessarily reduce the amount of political communication
accessible to candidates and groups. 2' Because the dissemination of political

18. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45 ("[T]he constitutionality of [FECA's expenditure limits] turns
on whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny
applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression."). Cf.FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 252 (1986) (indicating only that independent
expenditures are at the core of our First Amendment interests and thus must be justified by a
"compelling state interest"); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134 (stating that "[i]n Buckley and subsequent
cases, we have subjected restrictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on
campaign contributions"); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003) (reconciling the two degrees
of scrutiny by stating that their operation "turns on the nature of the activity regulated"; also
suggesting that the "compelling interest test" applies to a limitation on corporate expenditures);
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 164 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I continue to believe that campaign finance
laws are subject to strict scrutiny."); Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2488-89 (plurality opinion) (heavily
relying on Buckley, but otherwise entirely failing to articulate a standard of review for expenditure
regulations).
19. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137, 231 (stating that "[t]he less rigorous standard of review we have
applied to contribution limits (Buckley's 'closely drawn' scrutiny) shows proper deference to
Congress' ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular
expertise"); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (upholding contribution limitations under the lesser
standard which requires a state to demonstrate a "sufficiently important interest and employ[] means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms"); Randall, 126 S.Ct. at
2492 (plurality opinion) (reasserting the "closely drawn" standard of Buckley but focusing on
"whether Act 64's contribution limits prevent candidates from 'amassing the resources necessary for
effective [campaign] advocacy' (alteration in original)); Citizens for Clean Gov't v. City of San
Diego, 474 F.3d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying "Buckley's reduced scrutiny" to limits on
contributions to ballot measure campaigns and holding that they were not "'closely drawn' to match
a 'sufficiently important government interest').
20. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-27 (declining to reach ancillary justifications because that Act's
primary justification of preventing corporation and the perception thereof was sufficient to satisfy
the reduced scrutiny required).
21. Id. at 19. Spending restrictions necessarily "reduce[d] the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached." Id. Justice Stevens, however, disagrees. See Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2508-09 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). He asserts in his Randall dissent that a candidate does not need money to speak, and
that a candidate on a budget is not limited in his capacity to deliver speeches and conduct interviews.
Id. at 2508. However, Justice Stevens, with his willingness to uphold expenditure limitations,
overlooks the fact that without substantial media coverage, the public might not know when or
where to receive the message of a candidate. Indeed, even the frugal candidate who delivers a

views is directly correlated to the amount of media purchased,22 expenditure
limitations "impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected
freedoms of political expression and association .
*...,23 By contrast,
contribution limitations bear only a tangential relationship to these First
Amendment concerns because the contributor's donation provides him a
"symbolic" expression of his values. 2 4 In conjunction with his ability to
freely discuss issues of the American political landscape, the (reasonable)
regulation of his contributions is sufficiently justified as an anti-corruption
device.25
In Randall v. Sorrell,26 the Court validates the aforementioned principles
and further fuels the debate on its campaign finance jurisprudence.2 7 While
campaign reform is a highly contentious issue in both Congress and the state
legislatures, the big debate may actually be situated in the judiciary. 28 And

speech in a public park may not have anyone to speak to without first absorbing the cost of
advertising his event. An incumbent can more readily acquire news coverage, so the Justice's
assertion that "seasoned campaigners" have endorsed expenditure limitations reduces the credibility
of his argument. Id. at 2509.
22. In addition to the free media exposure given incumbents, Senator Mitch McConnell attributes
the difficulty of disseminating political views to the dispersion of eligible voters, to the expense of
televised advertising, and to the splintering of the television market caused by increasing channel
availability. See Campaign Contribution Limits: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin.,
106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Rules &
Admin), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senate_
hearings&docid=f:55770.pdf.
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
24. Id. at 21. This is a pivotal point in campaign finance law, on which the distinction between
contributions and expenditures in campaign finance jurisprudence hinges. See id. The underlying
premise is that while expenditure limits impose "direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of
political speech," id. at 39, contribution restrictions "entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Id. at 20. The Court in Buckley averred that
large contributions serve the same purpose-to the contributor, that is-as small contributions: "a
general expression of support." Id. at 21. Under this model, an increase in the size of a contribution
is but a demonstration of the "intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate." Id. (emphasis
added). Therefore, a cap on the amount an individual can spend is little more than an indirect check
on the contributor's freedom to communicate. Id. This argument is weak, however, because by
asserting that contributions only curb the speech of the would-be recipient, and not the contributor
himself, the Court ignores the right of an individual to pay another to speak for him. See id.
25. See id. at 25; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388-90 (2000);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003). In Buckley, two additional governmental interests
were offered to support FECA's contribution limits: (1) the creation of equal political access for all
citizens, and (2) the deceleration of the rising costs of campaigns, which would in turn offer political
opportunities to less wealthy individuals. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26. However, the Court found it
unnecessary to evaluate these reasons because the stated anti-corruption objective was sufficient to
uphold the limits. Id. at 26.
26. 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006).
27. See id. at 2490 (plurality opinion) (disappointing critics by "declin[ing] . . . to reconsider
Buckley" in light of its rank as well-established precedent); see also Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado 1), 518 U.S. 604, 631 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that, contrary to Buckley, strict scrutiny should be the test for both campaign expenditure limitations
and contributions).
28. Several Justices have criticized the Court's application of less rigorous scrutiny to
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the big question in the big debate: Is the Buckley framework truly a superior
solution and, as such, deserving of the faithful application of stare decisis, or
is the outcome of Randall merely indicative of the Court's division, and
consequential paralysis?2 9 There are merits to both conclusions and each
will be discussed in turn.
This Note will accordingly explore the Randall decision and the
reasoning that substantiates its final disposition. Part II presents some
historical insight through an evaluation of relevant precedent and other
issues peripheral to campaign finance. 30 In Part III, campaign finance
reform and the history of laws specific to Vermont are discussed.3 1 Part IV
supplies the facts significant in Randall,32 and Part V provides a
comprehensive analysis of the Court's plurality, concurring, and dissenting
opinions.33 Part VI offers a glimpse of the legal and societal implications of
Randall, touching the current
state of the law.34 Finally, concluding remarks
35
VII.
Part
in
found
can be
II.
A.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Pre-Buckley v. Valeo

Attempts to regulate campaign finance date back to the mid-nineteenth
century. 36 The first steps toward legislation can be imputed to the post-Civil
War industrial expansion and the amassing of wealth by a small, affluent

contribution limits. See, e.g., Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 405-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 410-20
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 635-44 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Randall, 126 S.
Ct. at 2501-06 (Thomas, J., concurring only in the judgment). In fact, Justices Stevens, Scalia, and
Thomas all unambiguously called for Buckley to be overturned, with other Justices leaning in that
direction. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2506-07 (Thomas, J., concurring only in the judgment and
Scalia, J., joining); id. at 2506-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29. The Court is deeply divided, six ways in fact, on the issue of campaign finance regulation.
See Supreme Court 2005, supra note 14, at 287. There was hope that the recent change in Court
membership would create a different result. Id. Instead however, the Court retained its traditional
individual rights approach, which focuses on "whether and to what extent . . . [a] regulation
comports with the First Amendment." Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulicsof
Campaign FinanceReform, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1705, 1706 (1999).
30. See infra notes 36-119 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 135-66 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 167-258 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 259-73 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
36. See United States v. Int'l Union United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric. Implement Workers (UAWCIO), 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957) [hereinafter Automobile Workers].

sector of the population.37 This acute concentration of capital led to
concerns that the elite could pervade American politics using money and
power. 38 Congress enacted several pieces of legislation between the years
1867 and 1947, but early efforts at campaign finance reform were often

anemic in one way or another and efforts to enforce them crumbled.39
In 1972, Congress passed comprehensive legislation in the form of the

Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA").4 ° Original FECA provisions
consolidated earlier reforms and included mandatory disclosures of political
donations exceeding $100,

and of candidate and political committee

expenditures greater than $1,000 per year. 41 The Act embraced previous
laws against the use of corporate and union general treasury funds for
political

purposes,

but

specifically

approved

the

formation

and

37. Id.
38. The first campaign finance legislation, passed by Congress in 1867, was the Naval
Appropriations Bill ("NAB"), which prohibited government employees from soliciting contributions
from naval yard workers. See Hoover Institution, Important Dates: Federal Campaign Finance
Legislation, http://www.campaignfinancesite.org/history/financingl.html (last visited June 20,
2007). In 1883, the Civil Service Reform Act extended the NAB to all federal civil service workers,
eliminating the requirement that these employees make campaign contributions. Id. Several futile
disclosure laws followed, and American lawyer and statesman Elihu Root called for more effective
legislation, stating that: "The idea is to prevent ... the great aggregations of wealth from using their
corporate funds, directly or indirectly, [to elect legislators willing to] vote for their protection and the
advancement of their interests as against those of the public." Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. at 571
(quoting E. ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT & CITIZENSHIP 143 (R. Bacon & J. Scott eds.
1916)). Indeed, such legislation would "strike[] at a constantly growing evil"--namely, corruption.
Id. President Theodore Roosevelt, in a 1905 address to Congress, spurred the widely-held,
contemptuous view of "'big money' campaign contributions" by recommending that: "All
contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose ... be forbidden
by law." Id. at 572. Congress answered in 1907 with the Tillman Act, which prohibited direct
contributions to federal candidates by corporations and nationally-chartered interstate banks. See
Wayne Batchis, Reconciling Campaign Finance Reform with the First Amendment: Looking Both
Inside and Outside America's Borders, 25 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 27, 33 (2006). Congress amended it
to include public disclosure and expenditure requirements. "Id. The first contribution limits were
established by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1910 ("FCPA"), which was revised in 1925 to
extend the proscription of contributions to include "anything of value" and to introduce criminal
penalties for corporate contribution. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 116 (2003) (citing FEC v.
Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982)). One U.S, Senator described "'one of the
great political evils of all time"' as "'the apparent hold on political parties which business interests
and certain organizations seek and sometimes obtain by reason of liberal campaign contributions."'
Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. at 576; see also Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934)
(upholding the FCPA). The end of World War 1Ibrought another change in the political climate: the
influence of unions. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 116-17. Congress reacted by limiting union
contributions in the Hatch Act circa 1940, and eventually, through the Smith-Connally Act, which
prohibited labor unions' financial support of federal candidates altogether. Id. Restrictions were
extended further still by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, which brought all union election-related
expenditures within its prohibitions. Id. at 117.
39. See generally Batchis, supra note 38, at 33-35 (detailing campaign finance history and
observing that the creation of the first political action committee in 1947 "allow[ed] systematic
circumvention of laws designed to prevent 'the pernicious influence of large campaign
contributions."' (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 117)).
40. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 117.
41. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 117-18; see also Whittaker, supra note 1, at 1068-69.
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42
administration of separate segregated funds to be used for such purposes.
However, dissatisfaction with FECA's results-further augmented by the
Watergate scandal 4 3-facilitated amendments to the Act in 1974.44 The new
laws included rigorous contribution and spending limits applicable to both
campaigns and committees, public financing for presidential general election
campaigns, and provisions directing the formation of the Federal Election
Commission, an independent regulatory agency that would enforce
campaign finance directives. 4 The amendments attempted to "close[] the
loophole" that had fostered circumvention of the contribution limits imposed
on political committees. 46
Further still, limitations on individual
contributions to any single candidate were capped at $1,000 per election, in
addition to an overall annual limitation of $25,000. 47 These amendments
became the subject of a landmark Supreme Court case, Buckley v. Valeo.45
As the seminal campaign-finance case, Buckley merits a careful study before
moving on.

B.

Congress Asks and the Court Answers: Buckley v. Valeo

In Buckley, the court of appeals had upheld the 1974 FECA's
contribution and expenditure provisions on the basis that they should be
examined as "regulations of conduct rather than speech., 49 The Supreme

42. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 118. As a general matter, corporations may not make direct or
indirect contributions out of their general treasury funds. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). However, they can use treasury funds for some other activities,
including ballot measures and issue campaigns. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 793-95 (1978).
43. See Watergate.info, Watergate: The Scandal That Brought Down Richard Nixon,
http://watergate.info/ (last visited June 22, 2007) ("Watergate ushered in changes in campaign
finance reform and a more aggressive attitude by the media."); see also John W. Dean, II1,
Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609 (2000) (discussing Watergate and the corruption
involved).
44. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(amending the FECA of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)).
45. See id.; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 118-19.
46. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 118. Candidates could establish an unlimited number of PACs,
thereby circumventing the limits placed on PAC contributions to the candidate. Id.
47. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1976). Under FECA, a contribution is broadly defined
as "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made ... for the
purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(8)(A)(i) (1970); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 12-13. Individuals were also limited from spending $1,000 per year "relative to a clearly
identified candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. § 608(e) (1970); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
48. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
49. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 120 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(en banc) (per curiam) (relying on United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in upholding the
constitutional validity of FECA's contribution and expenditure limits)). But see Buckley, 424 U.S. at

Court, however, determined that the Act's limitations were "direct restraints
on [content-based] speech," and therefore had to be reconciled with the First
Amendment.5 ° Under a modified standard of scrutiny, the Court found the
Government's justifications for its constitutional transgressions sufficient to
uphold FECA's contribution limits only. 1 Use of this lower standard to
evaluate contribution provisions was defended on the grounds that such

16 ("We cannot share the view that the present Act's contribution and expenditure limitations are
comparable to the restriction on conduct upheld in O'Brien . . . . Some forms of communication
made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone ....
[T]his Court has
never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself
to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment.").
50. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 120 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21). While it is axiomatic that
Congress has the constitutional power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections, when
restrictions are content-based they are given greater protection and must be evaluated under strict
scrutiny. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; see also John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV.
1103, 1120 (stating that "[i]f the law is content-based, then the Court proceeds to apply strict
scrutiny, and usually finds the law unconstitutional"). However, the Court in Buckley did not
explicitly address whether the restrictions were content-based or viewpoint neutral, stating simply
that "[a]lthough the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to its
regulations," "the governmental interests advanced in support of the Act involve 'suppressing
communication."' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17, 39 ("The restrictions, while neutral as to the ideas
expressed, limit political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms."'). For other discussions about content-based restrictions on speech in the area of
campaign finance, see Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 110 (2d Cir. 2004) ("As a regulation of the
amount that a candidate can spend on speech made 'for the purpose of influencing an election,'
Vermont's expenditure limits are a content-based restriction on speech . . . . 'Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid'[;] . . . [t]o uphold a content-based restriction on speech, the
government must prove the existence of a compelling state interest to support the restriction, and that
the restriction is narrowly tailored to advance that interest." (citations omitted)). Other courts often
fail to directly discuss the distinction, but implicitly meet this prerequisite by observing that
expenditure regulations are not subject to the lower standard of scrutiny applied to time, place, and
manner restrictions. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18 ("Nor can the Act's contribution and
expenditure limits be sustained, as some of the parties suggest, by reference to the constitutional
principles reflected in such decisions as Cox v. Louisiana . . . ; Adderly v. Florida;and Kovacs v.
Cooper. Those cases stand for the proposition that the government may adopt reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations, which do not discriminate among speakers or ideas, in order to
further an important governmental interest unrelated to the restriction of communication."). But see
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2508 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Act 64's
"limits on expenditures are far more akin to time, place, and manner restrictions than to restrictions
on the content of speech" and "[l]ike Justice White, I would uphold them 'so long as the purposes
they serve are legitimate and sufficiently substantial"' (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 264 (White, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (failing to discuss the distinction between content-based and contentneutral restrictions))); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (same).
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26. Recognizing that the rights of political association and
participation are not absolute, the Court reasoned that even a considerable infringement on these
protected rights "may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and
employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms." Id. at
25. The Court then declined to reach peripheral justifications, and found that the objective of
preventing corruption was a "weighty interest," "sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First
Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling." Id. at 26-29.
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restrictions have only a marginal impact on the capacity of political players
to engage in the type of free speech associated with public elections."
Conversely, the unforgiving First Amendment restrictions imposed by
most of the expenditure limitations compelled the Court to invalidate these
infringing provisions. 3 Under the more rigid form of scrutiny commonly
applied to equal protection claims, the Court held that the Government's
interests in the prevention of corruption and equalizing speech 54 were not
sufficient "to justify the restriction on the quantity of political expression" of
a particular candidate. 55 Because "virtually every means of communicating

52. Id. at 20-21. The Court adds:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views,
but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of
communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his
contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the
intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate.
Id. at 21. However, this distinction has been criticized because "it completely misses the point of
why people make contributions and independent expenditures." Daniel R. Ortiz, Election Law as its
Own Field of Study, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1999). Indeed, people contribute to
campaigns to help their chosen candidate prevail in an election so that, as elected legislators, they
can make favorable changes in the law. Id. By this logic, the infringement on the First Amendment
rights of campaign contributors goes farther than the first-degree limits on their direct and
coordinated contributions. But see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (arguing that contribution limits are
indirect restraints on speech and, as such, are different in kind).
53. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 (applying what was labeled as "exacting scrutiny" to expenditure
limits). FECA defines expenditures as: "[A] purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit,
or gift of money or anything of value, made for the purpose of influencing" any election for "Federal
office." Id. at 147. The Buckley Court later narrowly construed the term "expenditure" to cover
only communications that "advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for
federal office," and do so using express terms such as "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot
for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."' Id. at 43-44 & n.52.
54. See id. at 48-49 (recognizing that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment"). Id. The Government had argued in Buckley that FECA's stringent expenditure
limits could be justified on the basis that individuals and groups would have a more equalized ability
to influence elections and issues. Id. at 48. However, the Court rejected this argument as contrary to
the purpose of the First Amendment. Id. at 49; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
266, 269 (1964) (recognizing the aim of the First Amendment is "to secure 'the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,"' and "'to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people"'
(quoting Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957))).
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55 (emphasis added). In addition to its approval of limits on individual
contributions, the Court also upheld disclosure requirements and public tinancing provisions. See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-87. However, the Court struck down several expenditure provisions that too
far eroded First Amendment liberties. See id. at 39-59. Specifically, these included limits on
candidate expenditures, on contributions by candidates and their families to their own campaigns,
and on expenditures disbursed independently and not coordinated with candidates or their respective
committees. See id.

ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money," core First
56
Amendment rights were implicated and heightened scrutiny was necessary.
On balance, the risk of corruption presented by an individual donor is quite
low. 57
Importantly, a review of the Court's decisional record reveals that
Buckley has governed its analysis in every major apposite case since 1976.' 8
In Randall, the Court evinced a willingness to further solidify Buckley's
position as the cornerstone of campaign finance
jurisprudence.5 9 Thus,
60
Buckley will frequently be revisited in Part V.
C. The Buckley Aftermath
In order to harmonize FECA with the Buckley result, further
amendments were enacted in 1976 and 1979.61 The years following Buckley
generated several encumbrances for reform proponents: soft money,62 sham

56. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. Indeed, "[t]he distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails
printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and
publicizing the event." Id.; see also Whittaker, supra note 1, at 1072 (confirming that "[tlo
overcome this heightened burden, the Government would have to show a substantial governmental
interest").
57. See Whittaker, supra note 1, at 1073. Because the risk of corruption was not a sufficient
governmental interest in the context of expenditure limitations, and because the Government's
additional justification of equalizing access was mistaken, the Court found all of FECA's
independent expenditure limitations unconstitutional. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-50.
58. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134 (2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. (Colorado I1), 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 386 (2000); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado /), 518 U.S. 604,
610 (1996) (plurality opinion); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 259-60
(1986); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm. (NPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 491 (1985); Cal.
Med. Ass'n. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1981) (plurality opinion).
59. See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2488-91 (2006) (plurality opinion) (stating that "this
Court has repeatedly adhered to Buckley's constraints," that "[sltare decisis... avoids the instability
and unfairness that accompany disruption of settled legal expectations," and that "we do not perceive
the strong justification that would be necessary to warrant overruling so well established a
precedent").
60. See infra notes 167-258 and accompanying text.
61. See Hoover Institution, Important Dates: Federal Campaign Finance Legislation,
http://www.campaignfmancesite.org/history/financingl.html (last visited June 20, 2007). These
modifications placed a ceiling of $20,000 per year on individual contributions to national parties, as
well as a maximum of $5,000 per year on individual contributions to any one PAC. Id. The
permissible value of in-kind donations by volunteers was increased, together with the amounts
triggering disclosure of contributions. Id. Unlimited spending was permitted by state and local
parties in their efforts to register voters, conduct get-out-the-vote campaigns, and distribute materials
to volunteers. Id.
62. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-26. The Court clarifies the distinction between "federal" or
"hard" money and "nonfederal" or "soft" money. Id. at 122. The former is money that is subject to
the contribution limits of FECA. Id. Based on FECA's definition of "contribution"-giving a gift
or anything of value "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal6ffice"---contributions
intended for state and local politics are outside of the ambit of the Act. Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 431(8)(A)(i)). Thus, at this juncture in time, individuals could contribute this "soft" money to
political parties-even national affiliates-so long as they were for the purpose of impacting non-
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issue advertising,63 and certain practices during the 1996 elections.64 As
politicians were able to skirt many FECA requirements, members of65
Congress realized that some of the Act's provisions were ringing hollow.
federal elections. Id. As a result of this money-mixing, the line between hard and soft money
blurred. See id. at 123-24. Parties were able to use soft money to partially fund certain events, such
as get-out-the-vote drives and the costs of some advertisements. Id. The McConnell Court was quite
critical of this practice, and rightfully so. See generally id. at 122-26. The nominal (or sham)
purposes for these contributions were non-federal, while the manipulation of federal elections was
the truly intended result. See id.; see also Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 80 (2005). With soft money
increasingly out of the purview of federal campaign finance law, the channeling of contributions to
national political parties became the name of the game. McConnell, 541 U.S. at 124 (indicating that
the two major parties spent soft money in "exponentially" increasing increments: of total spending,
"soft money accounted for 5% ($21.6 million) in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80
million) in 1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42% ($498 million) in 2000"). In fact, soft
money was further distributed to state parties, who could even more loosely (and secretly) attribute
non-federal money to federal purposes. Id. Interestingly, the McConnell Court explored the
psychological component underlying contributions by big corporations, whose executives often feel
that if they do not give large amounts, they will be "'shun[ned] or disfavor[ed]" by legislators and
thus at a political and economic disadvantage. Id. at 125 n.13 (citing declaration of Gerald
Greenwald, United Airlines). The Court also cited evidence that "not only were such soft-money
contributions often designed to gain access to federal candidates," candidates frequently and
deliberately persuaded donors to contribute soft money to sources that would eventually pass the
benefit back to them. Id. at 125. This loophole provided the central basis upon which Congress
enacted the BCRA. See id.
63. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126-29. Under FECA, "funds used for communications that
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate" were subject to its
restrictions. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). As
McConnell describes, this led to a new brand of advertising: the "issue ad." McConnell, 540 U.S. at
126-29. Therefore, while the funding of commercials using the candidate's name and containing
"magic words" such as "vote" or "elect" were proscribed, issue ads could be financed with soft
money and circulated without complying with FECA's disclosure requirements. Id. at 126. Similar
to how the line between soft money and hard money became blurred by national party collection, the
line between issue ads and express advocacy became distorted as the two grew to be "functionally
identical." Id. In fact, it has been said that "[w]hat separates issue advocacy and political advocacy
is a line in the sand drawn on a windy day." Id. at 126-27 n.16. Through these ads, large
corporations and unions were able to use money from their general treasuries to skirt FECA
regulations. Id. at 127-28; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Revisit Campaign Finance
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/20/
Washington/20scotus.html?ex=l 326949200&en=90292ee8584e453f&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&em
c=rss (discussing the BCRA's blackout period on corporate-sponsored election ads and how it must
be reconciled "with the free-speech rights of groups that say they are engaged in grass-roots
lobbying, the sort of genuine issue advertising the First Amendment protects").
64. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129-132. The Court in McConnell relied heavily on a 1998
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs report, which evaluated campaign finance in the 1996
elections. Id. at 129. The report detailed the raising of soft money, the practice of which entailed
granting large contributors special access to high-ranking officials and candidates. Id. at 130.
Coffees, overnights, dinners, and meetings were just some examples of "quality time" allowed
donors, whose funds would be used for sham issue advertising and other roundabout ways to dodge
FECA's restrictions. Id. at 130 n.28.
65. See id. at 129-30 (recognizing one Senator's observation that there was "overwhelming
evidence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed

It was manifest that 6new
legislation was necessary, but twenty-six years of
6
cases came before it.
First NationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti6 7 was decided in 1978, just two
years after Buckley was handed down. The Massachusetts statute at issue
criminalized bank and corporate expenditures made in connection with
select referendum proposals. 68 The Court concluded that the statute violated
the First Amendment. 69 The Commonwealth advanced several justifications
for the law, including that corporate participation in the referendum
proposals would "destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic
process," as corporations are generally more wealthy and influential than
individuals.7 °
However the Court disagreed, stating that "there has
been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been
overwhelming. . . .,,7 Furthermore, the risk of corruption that necessarily
accompanies the election of candidates for public office is simply not
present when the vote is on issues of public concern, as with a referendum

vote.72

our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal rubble" (citing S. REP. S.
105-167, at 4535 (1988)); id. at 129 (stating that "the 'soft money loophole' had led to a 'meltdown'
of the campaign finance system that had been intended 'to keep corporate, union and large individual
contributions from influencing the electoral process"').
66. See, e.g., FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado I1), 533 U.S. 431, 441
(2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000); Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado1), 518 U.S. 604, 610 (1996) (plurality opinion); FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political
Action Comm. (NPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 491 (1985); Cal. Med. Ass'n. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 194-95
(1981) (plurality opinion). FECA was enacted in 1972, but the next big renovation of campaign
finance laws did not come until the BCRA in 2002. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003) (observing that three chief developments in the years
following Buckley-soft money, sham advertising, and the Senate report on the 1996 electionsinfluenced Congress and its bid for further legislation "regulat[ing] the role that corporations,
unions, and wealthy contributors play in the electoral process").
67. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
68. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767-68; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp.
1977). The appellants in Bellotti were two national banking associations and three business
corporations prohibited by the statute from donating or spending "for the purpose of... influencing
or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any
of the property, business or assets of the corporation." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 756 (citing ch. 55, § 8).
Additionally, "[n]o question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income,
property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or
assets of the corporation." 1d. at 768 (citing ch. 55, § 8).
69. See Bellotti, at 777.
70. Id. at 789.
71. Id. at 789 (declining to really consider the appellants' argument that corporations "would
exert an undue influence on the outcome of [] referendum vote[s]" because there was no support for
it in the record).
72. Id. at 789-90. ("Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The risk of
corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections ... simply is not present in a popular
vote on a public issue. To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this
would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to
suppress it: The Constitution 'protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is
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Although FECA's expenditure limitations were invalidated in Buckley, a
73
similar matter resurfaced in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
where the Court upheld-most notably under a strict scrutiny analysis-a
Michigan statute that prohibited corporations from drawing on general
treasury funds to make independent expenditures in association with
candidates for state office. 74 At the outset, the Court reasoned that if the
statute's restriction of political corporate expenditures burdened free speech,
then it would have to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest. 75 By reference to Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens For Life, Inc. (MCFL),76 the Court determined that requiring a
corporation to spend only out of a special segregated fund indeed implicated
the First Amendment freedoms of expression and speech.77 Nevertheless,
the State's interests in preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption were sufficiently compelling to sustain the statute's corporate
expenditure limits.7" This was so because a corporation is capable of
accumulating considerable assets and therefore may be in the position to

unconvincing."' (footnote omitted) (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684,
689 (1959))). Further support for this premise is offered by Buckley, which states that: "[T]he
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ....
" Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1,48-49 (1976).
73. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
74. See id. at 660-61 (noting that corporations could however, under the statute, use funds from a
separate fund for political purposes, and that "[b]ecause persons contributing to such funds
understand that their money will be used solely for political purposes, the speech generated
accurately reflects contributors' support for the corporation's political views"). In Austin, it was
asserted that the interest in preventing corruption and the "corrosive and distorting effects [on the
political process] of immense aggregations of wealth" was vulnerable to the effect of free corporate
communication, and thus such communication must be censored. Id. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
However, in an atypical display of support for strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the statute under that
standard. Id. at 666 ("Because the right to engage in political expression is fundamental to our
constitutional system, statutory classifications impinging upon that right must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest. We find that, even under such strict scrutiny, the statute's
classifications pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause." (citation omitted)).
75. Id.
at 655.
76. FEC v. Mass. Citizens For Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 251 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(discussing violation of the First Amendment as applied to a non-profit organization). The Chamber
asserted that it was a non-profit organization similar to that in MCFL, and thus should not be
restricted from disbursing funds from its general treasury account. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 658.
77. This corporate requirement had to pass First Amendment muster because, the Court
reasoned, a small non-profit corporation would face certain pecuniary and tactical hardships in
administering a segregated fund. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 657. The Court further acknowledged that
this might act as a deterrent for political speech. Id. at 658.
78. See id. at 660 (holding that the State's rationale for the independent expenditure limits on
corporation was sufficient before going on to complete a proper strict scrutiny analysis by
determining whether the statute was narrowly tailored to complete its objective).

"obtain 'an unfair advantage in the political marketplace."' 7 9 Because this

"'resource[] amass[ing].' structure is essentially a state-created entity, the
Court was readily able to conclude that the State's proffered justifications
were sufficient. 80 Finally, the Court found these justifications were suitably
tailored to meet its objective of "eliminating from the political process the
corrosive effect of political 'war chests' amassed with the aid of the legal
advantages given to corporations."'"

Turning away from the corporate variety for a time, the Court in
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission (Colorado 1)82 concluded that application of FECA's Party

Expenditure Provision, which limited expenditures "in connection with" a
general congressional campaign,83 to independent individual and political
committee expenditures did not comport with the First Amendment. 84 The
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee ("Committee") had
purchased radio advertisements attacking an anticipated Democratic85
senatorial candidate, after having already exhausted its FECA allotment.

Under the Buckley rubric, FECA provisions that impose limits on direct-or

indirect but coordinated--contributions are enforceable.86 However, in
Colorado I, the "advertising campaign [had been] developed by the

[Committee] independently and not pursuant to any.., understanding with a
candidate." 87 Of course, the FEC advanced its routine compelling interest:
the need to disconnect corruption from American politics. 8 8 However, the

79. Id. at 659 (quoting MCFL,479 U.S. at 257).
80. See id. at 659 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257). Essentially, the economic advantages
enjoyed by corporations are given to them by the State. Id. Thus, the political power that
incidentally accompanies this economic enhancement can and should be subject to greater State
control. See id at 658-59.
81. See id. at 666; see also Whittaker, supra note 1,at 1079 (arguing that the Court's definition
of corruption was moving further than the traditional quid pro quo approach employed in Buckley,
and speculating on this new brand of corruption).
82. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
83. Id. at 608. "The evil of coordinated expenditures is that they allow the candidate to control
resources that he would otherwise be legally precluded from controlling." Scott E. Thomas &
Jeffrey H. Bowman, CoordinatedExpenditure Limits: Can They Be Saved?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV.
133, 145 (1999) (citing Rep. Comments of the Nat'l Republican Senatorial Comm. to the FEC, 15
(May 30, 1997)).
84. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado 1), 518 U.S. 604, 613 (1996).
This case eventually returned to the Supreme Court in 2001 to resolve certain issues unaddressed in
533 U.S. 431 (2001).
1996. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado 11),
85. Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 612.
86. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-26, 46-48 (addressing the argument that "expenditures
controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign might well have virtually the same
value to the candidate as a contribution and would pose similar dangers of abuse").
87. Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 614 (treating the "expenditure, for constitutional purposes, as an
'independent' expenditure, not an indirect campaign contribution").
88. Id. at 616. The Court's response: "We are not aware of any special dangers of corruption
associated with political parties that tip the constitutional balance in a different direction." Id. The
Court compared its previous observation in Buckley, that the lack of coordination in the context of
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Court found that the disconnect lay in the legislative record, where the

justifications for the "'markedly greater burden on basic freedoms' came up
short. 89 Thus, the Provision was constitutionally invalid as applied to the
Committee.9"
The Court, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PA C,9' determined
whether Buckley controlled similar state campaign finance statutes.92
Obedient to its by-then-settled precedent, the Court again endorsed Buckley
and declared its applicability to the several states.93 In attempting to invoke
the First Amendment's protections, a political action committee and a
candidate for Missouri state auditor together alleged that a Missouri statute

independent PAC expenditures helps to lessen the danger of quid pro quo exchanges, with the
similar effect of independence on party expenditures. See id. (citing FEC v. Nat'l Conservative
Political Action Comm. (NPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985)).
89. Id. at 617 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44).
90. Id. at 618-19, 635-44. Cf FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (ColoradoI),
533 U.S. 431 (2001) (upholding statute on facial challenge).
91. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
92. See id. at 381-82; see generally id. (approving "the appearance of corruption" as a
justification for First Amendment restrictions imposed by a Missouri statute).
93. See id. at 385-89 (giving a detailed account of the analytical structure laid out in Buckley and
rejecting the request to relax Buckley's standards). While the Court has not always articulated well
its intention to apply differing standards to expenditure and contribution limits "affecting
associational rights," it did so explicitly in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986), when it said that, "'[W]e have consistently held
that restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on
independent spending.' It has, in any event, been plain ever since Buckley that contribution limits
would more readily clear the hurdles before them." Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
387 (2000) (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S at 259-60). Interestingly, the Shrink Missouri majority avoids
directly articulating its own standard, instead leaving the dissent to address it in a rather scornful
tone. Id. at 405-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argues that political speech during
the electoral process is "the speech upon which democracy depends," and that "the Court's approach
is unacceptable for a case announcing a rule that suppresses one of our most essential and prevalent
forms of political speech." Id. at 405. The Justice accuses the majority of failing to acknowledge
the Court's flawed precedent, and believes that "[i]t is our duty to face up to adverse, unintended
consequences flowing from our own prior decisions ....
[T]he Court does not accept this obligation
in the case before us. Instead, it perpetuates and compounds a serious distortion of the First
Amendment resulting from our own intervention in Buckley." Id. at 406. Randall v. Sorrell was
thus not the first instance in which Justice Kennedy conveyed his disdain for Buckley and the Court's
willingness to adhere to it. Id.; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2501 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring only in the judgment). Consistent with his attitude in Shrink Missouri, the Justice
expresses support for the Randall result, but remains cynical about the way it arrived there. See id.
Justice Kennedy's argument is that "[t]he universe of campaign finance regulation is one this Court
has in part created and in part permitted by its course of decisions." Id. He criticizes the plurality's
endorsement of its own ability to determine whether a contribution limit is too generous or
restrictive, a feat he believes the Court should not attempt. Id.; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93, 286-87 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
Colorado 1,518 U.S. at 626-31 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695-713 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

limiting contributions to state candidates for public office was
Dissatisfied with the Eighth Circuit's misguided
unconstitutional.94
application of strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court insisted that a contribution
limit be only 'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest,"'
and that the "dollar amount of the limit need not be 'fine tun[ed]."' 95
Missouri advocated the usual interests of preventing corruption, both real
and apparent.96
However, opponents of the statute argued that the
Legislature ignored the substantial lack of empirical evidence identifying
actual corrupt practices. 97 Rather, the evidence adduced was the Missouri
voters' approval of an even more stringent ballot initiative.98 The Court
agreed with the Government that the public perception of corruption was
enough to demonstrate the nexus between the contribution limits and the
asserted governmental interest. 99 Although the proffered facts must be more

94. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 383. The Missouri statute at issue imposed limits ranging from $275
to $1,075 (adjusted for inflation and applying in the year the Shrink Missouri lawsuit was filed). See
Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.032 (1994). In fact, Missouri voters had previously approved a ballot
initiative with more stringent limits. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 382. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC had given the candidate, Fredman, the maximum amount allowable under the statute. Id. at
383. Suit was filed on the basis that the PAC would have given more to Fredman if permitted, and
Fredman would have been able to "campaign effectively only with more generous contributions than
§ 130.032.1 allowed." Id.
95. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 387-88 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976)). The
court of appeals had held that contribution limits had to satisfy a higher level of scrutiny than that
made compulsory by Buckley. Id. at 384. The Eighth Circuit had not only required Missouri to
show compelling interests for the contribution limits and that they were narrowly tailored, but also
found that Missouri's proffered interest in preventing corruption or the appearance thereof was
insufficient to survive the applicable standard. Id. The Supreme Court reversed and articulated the
appropriate lower standard for contribution limitations. Id. at 385. But see Christina E. Wells,
Beyond Campaign Finance: The First Amendment Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, 66 Mo. L. REV. 141, 152 (2001) ("The Court's current use of either strict or
immediate scrutiny, however, "is firmly grounded, and Shrink's refusal to confront and clarify its
standard of review in light of the prevailing approach is inexcusable.").
96. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 390 (recognizing that even without Buckley as precedent, the
interests would certainly be legitimate).
97. Id. at 390-91 (reiterating the Eighth Circuit's mistake in faulting the State for not having
actual evidence of corrupt practices or the perception thereof).
98. Id. at 382.
99. Id. at 390-91. In holding that the statute was not unconstitutional for lack of empirical
evidence, the Court reasoned that perception was enough because of the need for a healthy system of
government. Id. "Democracy works 'only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that
faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which
arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption."' Id. at 390 (quoting United States v. Miss. Valley
Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961)), Despite the lack of quid pro quo evidence, the Court
upheld the statute under the premise that the mere appearance of corruption is a sufficient
governmental interest. See id. at 390; see also D. Bruce La Pierre, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act, Political Parties,and the First Amendment: Lessons From Missouri, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101,
1105 (2002) ("[T]he Court transformed the government's interest in preventing actual quid pro quo
corruption or the appearance of such corruption into a much
broader . . . justification [for]
contribution limits."). But see Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court is
concerned about voter suspicion of the role of money in politics. Amidst an atmosphere of
skepticism, however, it hardly inspires confidence for the Court to abandon the rigors of our
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than "merely conjectural," "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or
down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised."' 00
A facial challenge to the limit on coordinated spending finally came in
Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee (Colorado II).I0I Because FECA's definition of "contribution"
was functional rather than formal, it included "expenditures made by any
person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with . . . a candidate, his
authorized political committees, or their agents. '' 102
Thus, although
independent expenditure limitations were unconstitutional under Buckley,
"[e]xpenditures coordinated with a candidate" were contributions under the
Act. 0 3 Without this qualification, the FEC argued, donors could circumvent
lawful individual contribution restrictions by donating to political parties
who would then inevitably spend toward their intended beneficiary.'0 4
Indeed, it was for this reason that the Court, under the lower standard of
scrutiny, found that FECA's limits on coordinated party spending were
closely drawn to correspond with the governmental interest in preventing
corruption.'0 5 In therefore finding the provision to be in accord with0 the
6
First Amendment, the Court rejected the Commission's facial challenge.

traditional First Amendment structure.").
100. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 391-92.
101. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
Colorado 11 was a facial challenge to the same statute found
unconstitutional as applied to the Colorado Republican Party's independent expenditures in
connection with a senatorial campaign. Id. at 437. The case was remanded for a consideration of
the facial challenge, which posed the question of whether all limits on expenditures by a political
party in connection with congressional campaigns are unconstitutional. Id. The Court rejected the
constitutional claims in Colorado H. Id.
102. Id. at 438.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 447. The Government asserted that the controversial expenditures should be dealt with
the same because they are "as useful to the candidate as cash, and that such 'disguised contributions'
might be given 'as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate."' Id. at 446
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,47 (1976)). In this sense, coordinated expenditures would, in
effect, be camouflaged contributions-a mere pretext at best. See id. at 447. Thus, the Court
agreed with the FEC that coordinated party expenditures are the "functional equivalent" of
contributions. Id.
105. Id. at 456.
Because coordinated party expenditures were treated as the "functional
equivalent" of contributions, the Court was able to apply the lower standard of scrutiny commonly
applied to contribution limits under Buckley's mandate. See id. at 447; see generally Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (applying the "closely drawn" standard to contributions, rather than the
more stringent "compelling interests narrowly tailored" standard).
106. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 465 (holding that coordinated party expenditures, unlike
expenditures in fact independent, may be constitutionally limited to reduce circumvention of
contribution limits).

D. A New Era: The BCRA and McConnell v. FEC
The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"), also
dubbed the McCain-Feingold bill, was an overhaul of all methods of
regulating political capital.'0 7 Notable provisions of the BCRA included its
blanket prohibition on all soft money flowing in and out of national
parties.' °8 Analogous restrictions were placed on state and local party
operations, although autonomy with respect to contributions to Political
Action Committees ("PACs") was preserved. 0 9 Not surprisingly, federal
candidates and officeholders were not permitted to raise, receive, or spend

soft money.110 Furthermore, issue ads purporting to be non-partisan, but
pointing to specific federal candidates and being paid for by soft money
from corporations and labor unions, were given temporal, source, and
disclosure requirements."'

The BCRA also required source disclosures

107. See Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). "BCRA is the most recent federal enactment
designed 'to purge national politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of "big
money" campaign contributions."'
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003) (quoting
Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957)). The bill was propagated by Senators John McCain
and Russ Feingold, but President George W. Bush signed the bill into law with some reservations: "I
believe that this legislation, although far from perfect, will improve the current financing system for
Federal campaigns."
Press Release, The White House, President Signs Campaign
Finance Reform Act (Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/03/20020327.html.
108. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134. Section 323(a) is added by the BCRA to FECA, and "takes
national parties out of the soft-money business." Id. at 133. Section 323(a) provides that "national
committee[s] of a political party . . . may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a
contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are
not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act." 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 441i(a)(1) (West Supp. 112003).
109. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 133-34. This is a general prohibition on the spending of soft money
by state and local party political groups to fund a "federal election activity." Id. at 134. A federal
election activity is narrowly defined as one of the following: (1) voter registration efforts if
occurring within 120 days before an election; (2) get-out-the-vote activities for an election in which
a federal candidate is on the ballot; (3) public communications that, in conjunction with identifying a
particular candidate, either promote or oppose him one way or another; or (4) services performed by
an employee of a state or local party affiliate who spends at least twenty-five percent per month of
his paid time on activities associated with a federal election. 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(20)(A)(i)-(iv) (West
Supp. 2003). As a corollary to § 323(b), § 323(f) prevents circumvention of the limits on party
committees by disallowing state and local candidates from collecting and using soft money to fund
communications supporting or opposing a federal candidate. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134.
110. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134. More specifically, § 323(e) prohibits Members of Congress,
federal officials, and candidates from raising soft money in connection with a federal election
(except for non-profits). Id.
111. See BCRA, tit. II, § 203(b) (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2003)).
BCRA labels these ads "electioneering communications," and prohibits the use of corporate or union
money to purchase advertisements that refer to a clearly identified federal candidate with sixty days
prior to a general election or thirty days prior to a primary. See § 201(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C.A §
434(f) (West Supp. 2003)); also, see supra note 63 for a discussion of "sham" advertising. Any
advertisements run within those times and which identify a federal candidate must be financed with
regulated, hard money or with individual donor contributions. BCRA, tit. II, § 201(a).
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under certain circumstances. ' 12 Finally, hard-money limits were
raised,
3
perhaps to offset the effect of newly-stifled soft money sources."
Constitutional challenge to the BCRA came in McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission,"1 4 where the Court upheld most provisions of the
mixed-bag piece of legislation. The Court again applied the less rigorous
"closely drawn" standard employed by Buckley and its progeny to campaign
contributions." 5 In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that strict scrutiny was
the relevant standard, the Court noted that, "[c]onsiderations of stare decisis,
buttressed by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe to
one another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis
of contribution limits that the Court has consistently followed since Buckley
was decided."'" 6 The fact that § 323 restricted not only contributions, but
also the spending and solicitation of soft money, was of no moment to the
Court, which stated only that "it is irrelevant that Congress chose in § 323 to
regulate contributions on the demand rather than the supply side.""' 7 The
Court opined that the spending limits, designed to prevent circumvention of
the contribution limits, did not burden speech any more heavily than

112. See BCRA, tit. II, § 201(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(a)(1 l)(B) (West Supp. 2003)).
113. See BCRA, tit. lII, § 307 (amending 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 2003)). The
limits for individual contributions were raised from $1,000 to $2,000 per candidate per election. Id.
Furthermore, the limit for individual contributions to national party committees was originally
capped at S20,000, but raised to $25,000 by the BCRA. Id. Finally, the limit on individual
contributions to state and local party committees was raised from $5,000 to $10,000. Id. Thus,
while Title I focuses heavily on soft money bans, Title II grappled with sham issue advertising. See
generally McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
114. Senator Mitch McConnell filed his constitutional challenge in district court only twenty
minutes after the BCRA had been enacted. Whittaker, supra note 1, at 1086 (citing Supreme Court
Rules on Campaign Finance Case: The Legal and Political Impact ofMcConnell v. FEC (C-SPAN
television broadcast Dec. 11, 2003) (statement of Kenneth W. Starr), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/2003121 lcfr.pdf). A tripartite majority opinion was issued
in the case, which was a 5-4 decision in favor of upholding most of the BCRA's provisions. See
generally McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
115. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 138 n.40; see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-26 (1976)
(applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA's limits on contributions); Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453
U.S. 182, 195-96 (1981) (plurality opinion) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to contribution limits);
FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208-11 (1982) (applying less rigorous scrutiny);
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado If), 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001) (applying
less rigorous scrutiny to coordinated expenditures because they were considered "functionally
equivalent" to contributions by the Court); Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2491-95 (2006)
(plurality opinion) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to contribution limits, although limits still unable
to pass muster); Citizens for Clean Gov't v. City of San Diego, 474 F.3d 647, 649-52 (9th Cir. 2007)
(applying less rigorous scrutiny in the context of contributions to candidates during the signaturegathering phase of a recall election).
116. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137-38.
117. Id. at 138.

traditional restraints on contribution." 8 It then proceeded to uphold most of

the BCRA's prohibitions and mandates."
III.

9

BACKGROUND ON VERMONT LAW

While their durability remains uncertain even after Randall, cases like
Buckley and McConnell may be used by states to gauge the constitutionality
of their own campaign finance laws. Vermont legislators, much like

members of Congress, have grappled with campaign finance regulation for
years.120 In 1916, to dilute the influence of political money, the Vermont
Legislature enacted mandatory disclosure requirements, which compelled
the reporting of candidate expenditures and expenditures on a candidate's
behalf.'2 ' Limits on campaign spending in primaries followed in 1961,122
and then in 1971, expenditure ceilings were increased and imposed on
general elections.1 23 In the aftermath of Buckley, the Legislature repealed its
spending restrictions. 124
Despite these efforts, the corrosive effect of quid pro quo arrangements
had made corruption a prominent feature in State politics during the

1990s.1 25 Public cynicism about campaign money received ample attention
in the media-demonstrating the existence of a recognized governmental
interest: the prevention of perceived corruption. 126 Indeed, several telling

118. Id. at 138-39 ("The relevant inquiry is whether the mechanism adopted to implement the
contribution limit, or to prevent circumvention of that limit, burdens speech in a way that a direct
restriction on the contribution itself would not. That is not the case here.")
119. See generally id.
However, two major components of the BCRA were declared
unconstitutional. See FEC Watch, McConnell v. FEC, Summary of the Supreme Court's Decision
(Dec. 10, 2003), http://www.fecwatch.org/law/court/mcconnelltable.asp (last visited June 25, 2007).
The first forced political parties, during a general election campaign, to choose between making
limited coordinated or unlimited independent expenditures in aid of their chosen candidates. Id.
The second prohibited minors from making contributions to political parties and candidates. Id.
120. See Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 464 (D. Vt. 2000), affd in part and vacated in
part,382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
121. Seeid. at464n.3.
122. See id. at 464 n.4. Each state candidate was allowed $7,500 in expenditures, a remarkable
amount in 1961 dollars and relative to Buckley's limits. Id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7
(1976). The cost of media advertising, even when purchased by another, was regarded as the
candidate's own disbursement under the 1961 laws. See Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 464 n.4.
123. See Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 464 n.5. Contribution limits of $1,000 were introduced and
applied to sources other than political parties. Id. While political parties retained their limitless
spending capacities, contributions to parties were capped at $1,000. Id.
124. Id. at465.
125. Id.
126. Id. On the subject of newspaper coverage of citizen concern about campaign finance reform,
the Court said that, "[w]hile much of the coverage is anecdotal and thus is not persuasive evidence of
actual corruption, it does nevertheless demonstrate the attention these issues received in Vermont
and conveys the type of pressure that legislators must have felt to react." Id.; cf Nixon v. Shrink
Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding statute without evidence of actual corruption and
on the basis that perception of corruption is a sufficient concern).
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examples of clandestine persuasion were recounted in Landell v. Sorrell, a
district court case consolidated as Randall v. Sorrell, the subject of this
Note. 127 At the same time, out-of-state control-seekers dumped large sums
in
into the campaign accounts of Vermonters 2 and the pressure for reform
29
elections.1
1996
the
with
Congress,
for
had
it
as
culminated,
Vermont
The state of Vermont law in 1997, when legislators resurrected
1 30
campaign finance regulations for discussion, was not uncommon.
Candidates were not permitted to receive more than $1,000 from any single
individual, corporation, or labor union, whereas PACs could contribute up to
$3,000 to a candidate.' 3 1 Contributions to these same PACs were similarly
limited to $3,000.132 Perhaps decreasing the efficacy of these provisions,
political parties were left unregulated. 33 Notably, Vermont provided
candidates with a "voluntary" opportunity to comply with the State's prelimitations-a system which proved more idealistic than
Buckley 134
practical.

IV. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF RANDALL V. SORRELL

Mindful of the rising public suspicion of big money in politics, the
Vermont General Assembly enacted Act 64 during the 1997 legislative
session after extensive hearings on the subject. 33 Enjoying scant opposition,

127. See, e.g., Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (noting that "[r]egarding donations from tobacco
companies, . . . 'it's disturbing that Republican lawmakers, armed with $25,450 in donations from
tobacco giant Philip Morris, weakened an anti-smoking bill in the final hours of the 1997 session').
128. Id. (recognizing that the purchase of influence by out-of-stale contributors has a substantial
downside: "the cost is public trust").
129. Id. (noting the large influx of special interest money to candidates during this time).
130. Id. at 465. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1015(1) (1993) ($500 per election
limit on contributions for governor, $250 for other statewide offices); FLA. STAT. § 106.08(i)(a)
(2003) ($500 limit per election contribution limit); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-25-1.1 (2004) ($1,000
per year, or $500 per election); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216(1)(a) (2005) ($500 per election for
governor, $250 for other statewide offices).
131. Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 465. Political committees were defined as a non-party group that
received or distributed money "for the purpose of supporting or opposing one or more candidates or
affecting the outcome of an election." Id. (quoting former VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801(4) (2002)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing former VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2841-42). However, there were significant
decreases in participation each election cycle, going from ninety percent adherence in 1993 to under
ten percent adherence in 1998. Id.
135. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-2883 ("Act 64"); see also Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at
466. Many legislative committees considered Act 64 during its drafting phase. Id. Over sixty-five
hearings were held and more than 145 witnesses interviewed. Id. Evidence considered by the
Legislature included campaign finance summaries for various elections, media statistics during
election times, citizens' polls, and testimony regarding the pressure to raise funds. Id. at 467. In

the bill was passed by bipartisan enthusiasts in both houses of the
Legislature,3 6and Governor Howard Dean signed the bill into law without
hesitation.1
A.

Campaign Expenditures

If one thing was clear at the outset, it was that the Act was bold: it
limited campaign expenditures of the non-corporate variety for the first time
since Buckley declared them unlawful in a fairly transparent opinion. 37 The
Act took effect immediately following the 1998 elections and each of its
3
limitations was expressed in terms of a "two-year general election cycle."'1
Key provisions limited the spending of major political players, including
candidates for governor ($300,000 maximum), lieutenant governor
($100,000 maximum), other statewide offices ($45,000 maximum), state
senator ($4,000 base, plus $2,500 for additional seats in the district), twomember district state representative ($3,000 maximum), and one-member
district state representative ($2,000 maximum). 3 9 Incumbents to statewide
offices were capped at eighty-five percent of the amounts afforded their
challengers, 40 and candidates seeking reelection 14to
the State Senate or
1
House encountered a similar ninety percent ceiling.

turn, the Legislature made certain findings that were relied upon by the District Court, in addition to
other evidence proffered at trial. Id. This became a strong point for critics of the Randall Court's
choice to not reevaluate Buckley, in light of the lower court's extensive record.
136. Vermont Governor Howard Dean was a staunch supporter of Act 64, addressing the State's
legislature in 1997: "'[Mioney does buy access, and we're kidding ourselves and Vermonters if we
deny it."' Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 465. Compare Press Release, supra note 107 (describing
President Bush's reservations in signing BCRA).
137. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (holding that "the First Amendment requires the
invalidation of the Act's independent expenditure ceiling"). So why then did Vermont dare?
Vermont legislators wanted to get the Court to reconsider Buckley. See Memorandum from Deborah
L. Markowitz, Vt. Sec'y of State, to Senate Gov't Operations/House Local Gov't Comms. (Jan. 9,
2001) (asserting that some of Act 64's provisions were enacted with the "express legislative goal of
giving the Supreme Court an opportunity to reevaluate its decision in Buckley v. Valeo"), available
at http://vermont-elections.org/electionsl/2001gamemocf.html; see also Brain L. Porto, Less is More
and Small is Beautiful: How Vermont's Campaign-FinanceLaw can Rejuvenate Democracy, 30 VT.
L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2005) ("Since its enactment, then, Vermont's Act 64 has been on a collision course
with Buckley v. Valeo. Buckley invalidated limits on campaign expenditures, but Act 64 imposed
limits on campaign expenditures. This important disparity reflects the Vermont Legislature's intent
to challenge Buckley when it enacted Act 64.").
138. This includes the primary and the general election. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2486
(plurality opinion) (2006). The Act defines expenditure as the "payment, disbursement, distribution,
advance, deposit, loan or gift of money or anything of value, paid or promised to be paid, for the
purpose of influencing an election, advocating a position on a public question, or supporting or
opposing one or more candidates." § 2801(3).
139. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2486 (plurality opinion) (citing § 2805a(c)). Note here that, based
on the Consumer Price Index, the expenditure limitations are indexed for inflation in odd-numbered
years. § 2805a(e).
140. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2486 (plurality opinion).
141. Id.

184
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Coordinated expenditures 42 of greater than fifty dollars, made by
individuals, political parties, and political committees, were attributed to the
candidates themselves; as such, they were deducted from the candidates'
own expenditure allowances. 143 Notably, the Act provided for "presumed"
coordinated expenditures where party spending "primarily
benefit[ed] six or
144
fewer candidates ... associated with the political party."'
B.

Campaign Contributions

The contribution limits imposed by Act 64 were at the time
unparalleled. While these limitations were also based on a "two-year
general election cycle," the ceilings on individual donations were not
indexed for inflation. 45 The Act imposed a $400 cap on contributions to
46
candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, and other statewide offices.1
Donors were also restricted in the amounts they could give to candidates for
state representative ($200) and state senate ($300). 4 ' These limits were not
confined to individuals; indeed they applied to political committees and
parties as well. 48 Under these parameters, financial assistance by political
parties was nearly foreclosed, especially since the local, state, and national
levels of any political party were treated as a single entity for purposes of
giving to any particular campaign. 149 Furthermore, political parties could

142. Coordinated expenditures are defined by Act 64 as expenditures "intentionally facilitated by,
solicited by or approved by" the candidate's campaign. § 2809(b), (c). Essentially, this includes all
funds greater than fifty dollars spent "on a candidate's behalf' or "that is coordinated with the
campaign and benefits the candidate." See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2486 (plurality opinion).
143. Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2486 (plurality opinion) (noting that "[t]hese provisions apply so as to
count against a campaign's expenditure limit any spending by political parties or committees that is
coordinated with the campaign and benefits the candidate").
144. Id. (citing § 2809(b), (d)).
145. 1d. at 2486.

146. Id. (citing § 2805(a)). The Act defines contribution as "[a]ny expenditure made on a
candidate's behalf . . . if it is 'intentionally facilitated by, solicited by or approved by' the
candidate." Id. at 2486-87 (citing § 2809(a), (c)). Furthermore, "a party expenditure that 'primarily
benefits six or fewer candidates who are associated with the' party is 'presumed' to count against the
party's contribution limits." Id. at 2487 (citing § 2809(a), (d)). Thus, the effect of coordinated
expenditures was duplicative: they counted against both the party's contribution limit and the
candidate's expenditure limit. See id.
147. Id. (citing § 2805(a)).
148. Id. The Act defined a political party as "'any subsidiary, branch or local unit' of a party, as
well as any 'national or regional affiliates' of a party (taken separately or together)." Id. (citing
§ 2801(5)).
149. Id. As the Court points out, any political party-its national, state, and local parties
combined-may only give $400 to a particular candidate. Id. While this may arguably have been a
way to bait the Court into reevaluating Buckley, Act 64's proponents argued that it was grounded in
legislative findings and evidence. See Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466-74 (D. Vt. 2000).

receive no more than $2,000 from any individual in a corresponding twoyear cycle. 5 0
The impact of the above limitations was only slightly alleviated by the
Act's exceptions. A candidate's own capital, the contributions of his
family,' 5 1 the services of volunteers,152 and the costs of some meet-thecandidate functions 53 were excepted from. regulation.
The Act did,
however, limit the amount of money candidates, political committees, and
parties could amass from out-of-state sources. 54 This final limitation was
held unconstitutional
by the district court and was not afterwards
55
contested.
C. ProceduralDisposition
Neil Randall, a state legislator, initiated suit in federal court against
Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, charging that the Act's
provisions were unconstitutional regulations of First Amendment
freedoms. 156 By his complaint, Randall asserted that Act 64's expenditure
limits were unlawful under Buckley, and further that its contribution limits
were unconstitutionally low."' In response, Sorrell contended that Buckley
was outdated. 58 He further disputed that the contribution limits were
excessively low, pointing to Vermont's increase in either, or both, actual
corruption or the public perception thereof. 5 9 The district court struck down
the expenditure limits, staunchly relying on Buckley as precedent and in fact
holding that they were per se unconstitutional. 60 In addition, while it held
some of the contribution limits lawful, it invalidated on constitutional
grounds the limits on political party contributions to candidates.' 6 ' However

150. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2486 (plurality opinion) (citing § 2805(a)).
151. Id. at 2487 (citing § 2805(f)).
152. Id. (citing § 2801(2)).
153. Id. (citing § 2809(d), which allows expenditures up to $100).
154. Id. (citing § 2805(c)).
155. Id. Other provisions not disputed in Randall include disclosure and reporting requirements,
and the voluntary public financing system for gubernatorial elections. Id.
156. See id. at 2487. Neil Randall was joined by individuals who had run for state office,
Vermont voters and campaign contributors, and political parties and committees involved in State
politics. Id.
157. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (D. Vt. 2000).
158. Id.
159. Id. at474.
160. Id. at 463-64; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Rut cf Randall, 126 S. Ct, at
2511 ("We said in Buckley that 'expenditure limitations impose far greater restraints on the freedom
of speech and association than do . . . contribution limitations,' but the Buckley Court did not
categorically foreclose the possibility that some spending limit might comport with the First
Amendment. Instead, Buckley held that the constitutionality of an expenditure limitation 'turns on
whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the [applicable] exacting
scrutiny."' (citation omitted) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976))).
161. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2487 (plurality) (citing Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459).
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the Second Circuit disagreed, 6 and reversed the lower court on two bases:
(1) that the Act's contribution limitations were all plainly constitutional, and
(2) that its expenditure limitations might also be found constitutional if, on
remand, the Government could prove the existence of compelling
governmental interests. 163 Both sides sought appeal.' 64
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed,
holding that both the contribution and expenditure violated the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. 165 The implications of the suit were
significant: the Supreme Court had declined the opportunity to reexamine
the paradigm set forth in Buckley, and at the same time, endorsed its own
ability to determine166 how much is too much (or too little) when it comes to
campaign finance.

V.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

More than three decades after Buckley, the Supreme Court was faced
with questions akin to those presented by FECA. 67 In holding that Act 64's
expenditure limitations could be upheld if the Government demonstrated
compelling, narrowly tailored interests in support of the regulations, the
Second Circuit recognized that content-based speech was implicated and
thus had to be protected by a higher level of scrutiny-that is, strict
scrutiny. 168 Indeed this was not a novel scheme. 169 However, it further
162. See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 107 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Although the clear language of
Buckley requires that courts should review expenditure limits with exacting scrutiny, the District
Court in this case (and it is by no means alone) apparently felt that Buckley categorically prohibits
expenditure limitations. We disagree." (citations omitted)).
163. See id. at 108. Specifically, the Government would have to substantiate its claims of
corruption or the appearance of corruption in politics, and its assertion that there was a need to limit
the time candidates spend fundraising. Id. at 115-25.
164. The cases consolidated were: Randall v. Sorrell, 545 U.S. 1165 (2005); Sorrell v. Randall,
545 U.S. 1165 (2005); Vt. Republican State Comm. v. Sorrell, 545 U.S. 1165 (2005).
165. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
166. See generally id.; see also Supreme Court 2005, supra note 14, at283-88 (calling the case
the "redheaded stepchild of Supreme Court jurisprudence" and noting the dashed hopes of scholars
when the Randall Court declined to set forth a better framework than Buckley).
167. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2487 (plurality opinion) (considering the constitutionality of Act
64's contribution and expenditure limits). The Court had, of course, considered other cases under
the Buckley framework since FECA, but arguably none had created such anticipation that the
framework would be clarified. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238,
251 (1986) (violation of First Amendment as applied to non-profit organization); FEC v. Nat'l
Conservative Political Action Comm. (NPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (violation of First
Amendment); Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 193-94 (1981) (plurality opinion) (no violation
of the First Amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,23-25, 55 (1976).
168. See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 110 (2d. Cir. 2004) (recognizing that "[a]s a regulation of
the amount that a candidate can spend on speech made 'for the purpose of influencing an election,'

indicated that the Government's proffered interests were sufficiently
compelling to overcome the barrier imposed by the test-not a trivial
suggestion given the Court's consistency in invalidating expenditure
Further still, the Second Circuit's treatment of the Act's
provisions.7
contribution limits went astray from the Supreme Court's long-standing
jurisprudence.''
Historically, the Court has distinguished between
expenditure and contribution limitations, giving inequitable treatment to
both. 7 2 Indeed, the Buckley Court, viewing contribution restrictions as only
"marginal" restraints on free speech, insisted on a less rigorous standard
requiring only the demonstration of sufficiently important, closely drawn
interests.
Yet in Randall, the Second Circuit disregarded this precedent in
favor of strict scrutiny across the board. 74 Ultimately, however, the

Vermont's expenditure limits are a content-based restriction on speech"). "Content-based speech
restrictions, the Court says, are constitutional if they are 'narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest'; many have aptly called this an 'ends and means' inquiry." Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA L. REV. 2417, 2418
(1996). While the most prevalent compelling interest is preventing corruption and the perception of
corruption, the Court has accepted other interests as sufficient, including "'maintaining a stable
political system'; ensuring that 'criminals do not profit from their crimes'; ... protecting voters from
confusion, undue influence and intimidation; preventing vote-buying; [and] 'eliminating from the
political process the corrosive effect of political 'war chests' amassed with the aid of the legal
advantages given to corporations' . .. ." Id. at 2420-21. As a result of so many "compelling
interests," most cases striking down speech restrictions rely instead on the narrow-tailoring prong.
See id. at 2421; but cf Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (holding the Government's proffered justification
of "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections"
insufficient to justify restrictions); id. at 57 (finding the interest in "reducing the allegedly
skyrocketing costs of political campaigns" insufficient); NPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-97 (1985)
("[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling
government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.").
169. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
170. Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2487 (plurality opinion).
171. In Landell, the Second Circuit had determined that the Government's interests were
sufficient to overcome strict scrutiny. Landell, 382 F.3d at 125. It remanded to the lower court for a
determination of whether the Act's expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to its objectives. Id. at
136. The Supreme Court has only once upheld such regulations under a strict scrutiny framework,
so Landell's implications would have been far-reaching-had they not been halted by the Court on
appeal. For a detailed description of strict scrutiny and its applications, see generally EUGENE
VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES (2d ed. 2005).
172. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1. As mentioned previously, Buckley distinguished between campaign
contributions and expenditures. Id. at 20-21; see also 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.51 (3d ed. 2007). Because campaign contributions are
only an undifferentiated demonstration of support for any candidate, they are viewed as marginal
restrictions of free speech. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra, § 20.51. As a result of this seemingly
minute distinction, Buckley's holding remains contentious today. See Batchis, supra note 38, at 35.
173. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22.
174. Landell, 382 F.3d at 110 ("As a regulation of the amount that a candidate can spend on
speech made 'for the purpose of influencing an election,' Vermont's expenditure limits
are a content-based restriction on speech . . . . 'Content-based regulations are presumptively
invalid'. . . . To uphold a content-based restriction on speech, the government must prove the
existence of a compelling state interest to support the restriction, and that the restriction is narrowly
tailored to advance that interest.").
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modified intermediate scrutiny test-the same principle subscribed to in
Buckley--was resurrected by the Supreme Court on appeal.' 75
A.

Justice Breyer's PluralityOpinion

Justice Breyer makes use of Buckley's bifurcated analysis in structuring
his opinion. 7 6 Following a review of the operative Act 64 provisions and
the dispositions of the courts below, he examines the Act's expenditure and
contribution limits independently. 7 7 To begin, the Justice analyzes whether
the expenditure limits offend
the First Amendment guarantees of free speech
78
and political association.1
1. Expenditure Restrictions
Justice Breyer plunges directly into an instructive account of Buckley,
where, as previously mentioned, the Court considered the constitutionality of
FECA.179 There, the Court found that statute's expenditure ceilings violative
of the First Amendment. 80 The Justice further notes that, although the
Government's proffered justifications in that case--corruption and the
perception thereof-were sufficient to preserve the FECA's contribution

175. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2495 (plurality opinion) (reversing the Second Circuit and holding that
"[flaken together, Act 64's substantial restrictions on the ability of candidates to raise the funds
necessary to run a competitive election, on the ability of political parties to help their candidates get
elected, and on the ability of individual citizens to volunteer their time to campaigns show that the
Act is not closely drawn to meet its objectives" (second emphasis added)).
176. See id. at 2485-500 (discussing contribution and expenditure limitations separately).
177. Id. at 2485-87.
178. Id. at 2487 (stating the issue presented as whether the Act's expenditure limits "violate the
First Amendment's free speech guarantees").
179. Id. at 2487-88; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976).
180. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2488. Justice Breyer appears to be setting the stage for one of two
things: following Buckley or abandoning it. He builds up his discussion of the Buckley decision,
following his summary with the reminder that the Court has repeatedly adhered to Buckley's
constraints for over thirty years. Id. However, this does not stop many of Buckley's critics, who
argue that despite the fundamental importance of stare decisis, the Court should do its "duty" and
"face up to adverse, unintended consequences flowing from [its] own prior decisions." Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "Despite expressions of
discomfort by many justices with the way modem campaign finance is regulated, the Court declined
to rework Buckley v. Valeo .... Nor did it sanction a more lenient constitutional test to satisfy those
other justices who would prefer to give legislatures and Congress leeway to regulate politics."
Hayward, supra note 6, at 196; see also id. at 197 (describing how Randall took great pains to
explain why sparing Buckley reconstructive surgery was necessary and favorable); Randall, 126 S.
Ct. 2489 (plurality opinion) ("The respondents recognize that, in respect to expenditure limits,
Buckley appears to be a controlling-and unfavorable-precedent.").

limits, they could not save its spending limitations. 8 ' By reference to the

Buckley opinion, he articulates the underlying-and critical-basis for this
distinction: that expenditure limitations are significantly more abrasive to the
freedoms of political expression and association than are contribution
restrictions." 2 Setting the stage for his response to the respondents' pleas to
dispense with (or at least clarify) the Buckley framework, Justice Breyer

underscores83 the Court's whopping thirty-year reliance on Buckley as

precedent.
Justice Breyer then undertakes a deliberate and careful examination of
the Government's two main contentions. 8 4 The first asks the Court to
essentially overrule Buckley on the basis that contribution limits alone
cannot successfully thwart corruption or its appearance.' 85 Second, if the
Court finds this argument futile, the Attorney General contends that Buckley
should be distinguished from the case subjudice, because the Buckley Court

did not overtly contemplate as a justification the notion that expenditure
limitations would keep candidates from spending an excessive amount of

time raising campaign money rather than reaching the voting public.' 86 As
to the first, Justice Breyer dwells for some time on the doctrine of stare

181. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2487 (plurality opinion).
182. Id. at 2488 (explaining that "the basic reason for this difference between the two kinds of
limitations is that expenditure limitations 'impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected
freedoms of political expression and association than' do contribution limitations" (quoting Buckley,
424 U.S. at 23)). Justice Breyer carefully tailors his discussion to the language in Buckley. See id. at
2487-88. In fact, he cites few other authorities in his discussion of Act 64's expenditure limitations.
See id. at 2487-90. In light of the Justice's ensuing discourse on stare decisis, perhaps this is an
additional attempt to reinforce and clarify the Court's position on Buckley as precedent. See id. at
2488-90.
183. See id. at 2487. The Court refers to the most significant campaign finance cases in its
jurisprudence, each of which adhered to Buckley on some level: McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
134 (2003); FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado 11),
533 U.S.
431, 441 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000); Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado 1), 518 U.S. 604, 610 (1996) (plurality
opinion); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986); FEC
v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 491 (1985); California Medical Association v. FEC,
453 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1981) (plurality opinion). See Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2488 (plurality opinion).
184. See Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2488 (plurality opinion).
185. Id. An underlying assumption in Buckley was that contribution limits are effective in
deterring corruption, and so the Government in Randall essentially seeks to unearth, what it believes,
"post-Buckley" experience has shown not to work. Id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27
(1976) ("To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined . . . . Of almost equal concern . . . is the impact of the appearance of corruption

stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large
individual financial contributions."). Despite the Government's contention that "sound reasons exist
to revisit the applicable standard of review," the Court simply dismisses this request on the basis of
stare decisis. But see Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2500-01 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (stating that the Government only mentioned overruling Buckley as a peripheral
argument and thus it should not be reached).
186. Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2489 (plurality opinion).
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decisis, asserting that adherence to settled precedent must be the "norm" and
that departure from it "requires 'special justification. '1 7 He notes that
"[t]his is especially true where, as here, the principle has become settled
through iteration and reiteration over a long period of time."' 88 In
concluding that the Government did not demonstrate the requisite "special
justification," Justice Breyer accentuates the substantial reliance that
Congress and state legislatures placed on Buckley when enacting campaign
finance regulations, and the "instability and unfairness" that would result
from its disruption. 1 9
In response to the respondents' second contention, Justice Breyer
implies that the Government is grasping for a distinction that is simply not
present. 90 Indeed, he perceives no substantial difference between the
expenditure limits discarded in Buckley and the corresponding provisions of
187. Id. at 2489 (quoting Arizona v. Runsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). Rather than addressing
the deficiencies of Buckley as perceived by his fellow justices and academics alike, Justice Breyer
seems to use stare decisis as a shield. See id. As Justice Alito points out in his concurring opinion,
that the issue was not even explicitly briefed by the parties. See id. at 2500-01 (Alito, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). Why, then, does Justice Breyer insist on reaching it? Given
the sea of critics speculating on this issue, it seems plausible that he was on the early defensive. See
id. Or, one might argue, stare decisis was simply more convenient than having to articulate an
entirely new or modified structure. See Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedentand Principlein
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1988) ("[S]tare decisis has always been
a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and liberals ....
Its friends, for the most part, are
determined by the needs of the moment."); see also Robert Barnhart, Note, Principled Pragmatic
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1911, 1916 (2005) (stating that
"stare decisis may just be a judicial shortcut").
188. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2489 (plurality opinion).
189. Id. Customary factors for ignoring or overturning prior precedent include, "workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law, and changed or perceived changes in fact," while less
traditional factors may include, "margin of victory, age of the prior decision, and merits of the prior
decision." See Barnhart, supra note 187, at 1914-15. Under this paradigm, reconsideration of
Buckley in Randall would have been on the basis of "workability" or "intervening developments in
the law." See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2489 (plurality opinion). The Court explicitly addressed the
second in the plurality opinion, where it rejected the claim that "[p]ost-Buckley experience" has
changed the ability to combat corruption. 1d. The Court declines to directly discuss a change in the
Buckley structure based on the fact that it does not provide a workable standard for lower court. See
id. This is a gaping.hole in the plurality's opinion, which Justice Breyer unconvincingly patches
with his reference to the substantial reliance that Buckley has invoked. Id. at 2490 ("Overruling
Buckley now would dramatically undermine this reliance on our settled precedent."). Indeed, many
skeptics bristle at the idea of Buckley becoming superprecedent, but with the Randall opinion, that
seems to be where the Court is headed. See Hayward, supra note 6, at 195-98. It has also been
recognized that the application of stare decisis is selective, and therefore a more unstable solution
than simply discarding the precedent altogether. Id. (recognizing that the Court used its bifurcated
Buckley analysis in Randall, but not in Shrink Missouri).
190. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2490 (plurality opinion) (finding no basis for the distinction offered).
The "sole basis" on which the Government sought to justify the distinction was that the Buckley
court did not consider the argument that "expenditure limits are necessary in order to reduce the
amount of time candidates spend raising money." Id.

Act 64.191 Furthermore, the core justifications for each were the same.' 9'
The Justice rationalizes that the additional justification of the Act as a timesaving mechanism, even if tendered by the Government in Buckley,
would not have transposed the Court's decision. 193 Then, without added
discussion-or really any discussion--of the appropriate standard, Justice
Breyer brushes aside Act9464's expenditure provisions by concluding that
they are unconstitutional.1
2.

Contribution Restrictions

Justice Breyer begins once more with a discourse on Buckley, where in
the face of a $1,000 limitation the Court ruled that FECA's contribution
limits were, as a general matter, constitutional.1 95 He acknowledges in this
discussion that, like expenditure limits, contribution limits fall within the
ambit of the First Amendment's protections. 196 However, he relies on
Buckley's declaration that contribution limits involve "'little direct
restraint"' on the donor's speech. 97 Again, without identifying the precise

191. Id. Both FECA's and Act 64's expenditure ceilings contained dollar limits on individual
candidate spending. Id.
192. Id. (acknowledging that the primary justifications for both were the prevention of corruption
and the public's perception thereof). Because this was the same justification proffered and rejected
in Buckley concerning expenditure limits, Justice Breyer acts somewhat like he is wasting his breath.
See id. In any event, he does not spend much time on the issue. See id. at 2490-91.
193. Id. at 2490 ("In our view, it is highly unlikely that fuller consideration of this time protection
rationale would have changed Buckley's result."). Further still, irrespective of the lack of an explicit
consideration of time preservation as a rationale for the FECA's spending caps, Justice Breyer thinks
it unlikely that the Buckley Court did not make the "perfectly obvious" connection between time and
fundraising. Id.
194. Id. at 2491. Nowhere in his entire discussion of contribution limitations does Justice Breyer
pinpoint the level of scrutiny to be applied. See id. at 2488-91. Indeed, he provides no clarity for
lower courts-other than that they should rely on Buckley. See id. Furthermore, the word "scrutiny"
appears only once in the entire plurality opinion, and there it is in the context of "First Amendment
scrutiny," generally. See id. at 2492.
195. Id. at 2491 (referring to Buckley's "general approval" of contribution limits).
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)). Recognizing, as Buckley did, that
First Amendment interests are implicated by the regulation of campaign contributions, Justice
Breyer addresses why the freedoms of political expression and political association can be burdened
by contribution limits more so than expenditure limits:
[U]nlike expenditure limits, (which "necessarily reduc[e] the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached,") contribution limits "involv[e] little direct restraint on" the
contributor's speech. They do restrict "one aspect of the contributor's freedom of
political association," namely, the contributor's ability to support a favored candidate, but
they nonetheless "permi[t] the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution," and they do "not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss
candidates and issues."
Id. (citations omitted). In this noteworthy endorsement of the dichotomous approach used in
Buckley, Justice Breyer reasons that contribution limitations still allow donors to endorse specific
candidates, and thus may fairly be subjected to some obscure, lesser level of scrutiny. Id.
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category of scrutiny, the Justice refers only to the Government's obligation
in Buckley--to demonstrate that the limits were 'closely drawn' to match a
'sufficiently important interest."' 1 98

Justice Breyer then weighs in on Act 64's contribution limits, and
whether they "prevent candidates from 'amassing the resources necessary
for effective [campaign] advocacy.""

99

He finds that "danger signs" exist,

meaning that Act 64's contribution limits are so low that the statute itself
may advance the very electoral unfairness it seeks to avert. 200 Red flags
indicating that the Act's provisions may not have been "closely drawn"
include its underlying two-year election cycle and its application of the same
limitations to individuals and political parties.2 ' When these facets of Act
64 are taken into account, the Act's limits are considerably lower than those
upheld in Buckley.20 2 Another sticking point for the Justice: the Vermont

198. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). It is in the "closely drawn" component of this analysis
that the Court gets to decide: In running an effective campaign for office, how much is too much?
See id. at 2492. Justice Breyer conveys his valid concern that a limit that is too low can shield
incumbents from challenge because of the irrefutable advantages provided by name recognition and
a media-established reputation. Id.
199. See id. at 2492 (brackets in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). Although he
recognizes that the Court "cannot determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction
necessary to carry out the statute's legitimate objectives," and that the "legislature is better equipped
to make such empirical judgments," he makes an unsubstantiated leap to the Court's apparent need
to "recognize the existence of some lower bound." Id. Furthermore, no mathematical formula
follows. See id. Indeed, the Court does not provide any FEC study that has fairly and accurately
determined the amounts that should be spent on a competitive campaign. Instead, Justice Breyer
posits "[A]t some point, the constitutional risks to the democratic electoral process become too
great." Id. But at what point is that? And who decides? Justice Breyer says the Court must
ultimately decide because there is "no alternative to the exercise of independent judicial judgment as
a statute reaches [these] outer limits." Id. This failure reaps criticism from Justice Thomas. See id.
at 2506 (Thomas, J., concurring only in the judgment) ("[T]he plurality does not purport to offer any
single touchstone for evaluating the constitutionality of such laws. Indeed, its discussion offers
nothing resembling a rule at all. From all appearances, the plurality simply looked at these limits
and said, in its 'independent judicial judgment,' that they are too low." (internal citation omitted)).
200. See id. at 2492 (plurality opinion). The Court however, does not articulate a standard for
determining when "danger signs" are present. See id. This seems like a rather subjective analysis,
as Justice Breyer provides little numerical or evidentiary analysis. See id.; see also id. at 2505
(Thomas, J., concurring only in the judgment) (stating that "it is entirely unclear how to determine
whether limits are so low as to constitute 'danger signs' that require a court to 'examine the record
independently and fairly' (citing id. at 2492 (plurality opinion))).
201. Id. at 2492-93 (plurality opinion).
202. See id. at 2493. In fact, as Justice Breyer reveals, they are the lowest of any state when
evaluated collectively. Id. (calculating that Vermont's limit on individual contributions to a
gubernatorial candidate is just over one-twentieth of the limits on federal candidacy upheld in
Buckley). In addition, it must be considered that Act 64's limits are applicable to a two-year cycle,
whereas most other limits are expressed yearly. Id. Thus, when engaging in comparison, Act 64's
limits must often be halved. See id. Finally, as the Court recognized, Vermont's population is
significantly less than that of other states. Id. This is a weak point for Justice Breyer because some

limits are not indexed for inflation.2 °3 Because these "danger signs" exist,
Justice Breyer says, the next inquiry is to determine whether the contribution
limits are indeed "closely drawn" to corresponding government interests.20 4
The Justice then concludes that Act 64's contribution provisions suffer
from a fatal flaw: the limits are simply too low for the Court to view them as
bona fide restrictions. 20 5 This is exacerbated by the Act's regulation of
political parties and volunteers. 0 6 Justice Breyer sets forth five factors
which led to the plurality's determination.2 7
First, the Act too severely impinges on the political activity of
challengers who wish to mount effective, albeit more costly, campaigns.20 8
Second, as Justice Breyer recognizes, the Act's already low ceilings on
individuals are also applicable to political parties.20 9 At the crux of this
factor is the right of political association.1 0

of the contribution limits actually are less-stringent per voting citizen than some of these
jurisdictions. See id. at 2494. However, he summarily rejects this as a dispositive factor, stating
only that "this does not necessarily mean that Vermont's limits are less objectionable than the limit
upheld in Shrink." Id.
203. See id. at 2493; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). Missouri's
contribution limit, although the lowest ever upheld, was adjusted for inflation. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S.
at 383-84. Although, per citizen Vermont's is slightly more generous, Justice Breyer reasons that a
campaign for state auditor (the position at issue in Shrink) will be less costly. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at
2494 (plurality opinion).
204. Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2494 (plurality opinion).
205. Id. at 2495 (specifically describing them as "too restrictive").
206. Id. ("Taken together, Act 64's substantial restrictions on the ability of candidates to raise the
funds necessary to run a competitive election, on the ability of political parties to help their
candidates get elected, and on the ability of individual citizens to volunteer their time to campaigns
show that the Act is not closely drawn to meet its objectives."). Once again, Justice Breyer avoids
labeling the standard to be used for contribution limits, articulating only that they must be "closely
drawn." Id.
207. See id. at 2495-500.
208. Id. at 2495. To support his finding, Justice Breyer uses rather specific empirical evidence
indicating that challengers receive a large percentage of their funding from their political party
affiliates. See, e.g., id. (sharing one expert's calculation that the Act's contribution regulations
would have reduced the funding in 1998 to Republican challengers in competitive races in amounts
ranging from 18% to 53% of their total campaign income). Political parties, in turn, may contribute
a trivial $200 per election for some important statewide offices under the Act. Id. at 2494. Thus, as
Justice Breyer observes, the stringent party limitations are not so remote from the insulation of
incumbents that democratic principles seek to avoid. Id. at 2496. The Government submitted
findings that reflected the financing of "average" campaigns, rather than "strongly contested" ones.
Id. Indeed, a challenger in a competitive race must generate greater funding to defeat an opponent
who enjoys the benefits of incumbency. Id. Justice Breyer reveals the fallacy of the Government's
proffered statistics and soundly rejects them. Id. (clarifying the Government's misplaced reliance on
average race statistics and asserting that "the [accurate] studies, taken together with low average
Vermont campaign expenditures and the typically higher costs that a challenger must bear to
overcome the name-recognition advantage enjoyed by an incumbent, raise a reasonable inference
that the contribution limits are so low that they may pose a significant obstacle to candidates in
competitive elections").
209. See id. In the Justice's own carefully chosen words, "Act 64's insistence that political parties
abide by exactly the same low contribution limits that apply to other contributors threatens harm to a
particularly important political right .
I..."
/d.The use of the term "exactly" indicates that there may
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Third, the Act's approach to volunteer services provides an additional
and important basis for the Justice's dissatisfaction with its contribution
limits. 211 He observes that although the statute exempts the actual services
provided by a volunteer, it does not12allow volunteers to exclude their travel
2
expenses and other incidental costs.
Fourth, Justice Breyer points out that the contribution limits imposed by
Act 64 are not adjusted for inflation.213

not have to be a wide gap between party and individual limitations to satisfy Justice Breyer. Id. In
his dissent, Justice Souter makes clear that, in his opinion, identical limits on these two types of
contributions "does not condemn the Vermont scheme." Id. at 2515 (Souter, J., dissenting). He
argues that "[t]he capacity and desire of parties to make large contributions to competitive
candidates with uphill fights are shared by rich individuals, and the risk that large party contributions
would be channels to evade individual limits cannot be eliminated." Id.
210. Id. at 2496 (plurality opinion). As the limits on parties included contributions from all levels
of a party's organization, in addition to coordinated expenditures and expenditures-in-kind, Justice
Breyer paints a picture of the near impossibility of "amassing [enough] funds." See id. at 2497-98.
Furthermore, the Justice urges that the low party contribution limits will "thwart[] the aims of
[small-amount] donors from making a meaningful contribution to state politics" through political
parties that can no longer pass on these donations to their intended beneficiaries. Id. at 2497.
However, he defends the Court's prior decisions upholding limits on money flowing from political
parties to candidates, and distinguishes them from the instant case. Id. at 2498. He further
recognizes, as the Court did in those cases, the need to balance the capacity of individuals to donate
to political parties with the need to prevent the use of parties to circumvent individual contribution
limits. Id. Indeed, these two cannot be reconciled where, as here, a statute applies equal, meager
contribution limits to both individuals and political parties. Id. (agreeing with the lower court that
the Act's contribution limits "'would reduce the voice of political parties' in Vermont to a
'whisper' (quoting Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d. 459, 487 (D. Vt. 2000))).
211. See id. at 2498-99.
212. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801(2) (2002). Rather, any such expenses incurred count
against the volunteer's contribution limits. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2498 (plurality opinion)
(recognizing that expenses that volunteers incur must count as a contribution (or coordinated
expenditure) given the broad nature of the Act's definition of coordinated expenditures). Thus,
when evaluated against the low individual donation limits, the benefit of volunteer services
dissolves. See id. Further still, volunteers unfamiliar with campaign finance laws would be required
to keep scrupulous records of money spent in the course of service for a candidate. See id. at 249899. Justice Breyer acknowledges that higher limitations do not have the same devastating effect on
volunteer services, and in those instances it may be proper to include incidental expenses as
contributions. See id. at 2499. However, where an Act's contribution limitations are "so low, and its
definition of 'contribution' so broad," it is manifest that volunteers' rights to associate politically
will be crippled. Id.
213. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2499 (plurality opinion). The inevitable shrinking of the real value
of the limitations will require a future Vermont Legislature, full of disinclined incumbents, to enact
supplementary legislation. Id. Justice Breyer reasons that the failure to do so will certainly resultif it has not already-in limits that are unconstitutionally low. Id. There seems to be a hint of
distrust coming from the Justice here, as he deliberately incorporates "incumbent" into his
description of legislators who "may not diligently police the need for changes in limit levels to
assure the adequate financing of electoral challenges." Id. The problem to be inferred here is that
incumbents might place campaign finance limits too low, and then utilize their contact with the
media to compensate for their own supply reduction-an option unavailable to many challengers.

And finally, the Justice quickly asserts that no special justification can
cure the inadequacies identified by the considerations above.

1

4

In light of

these issues, he concludes that the Act's contribution limits are "not
narrowly tailored" to its objectives.21 5 Where First Amendment interests are
so acutely abridged, as by Act 64, it is axiomatic that disproportionate
regulations must be struck down as constitutionally infringing.2

6

After a

so, Justice Breyer declines to sever
doing
brief summary of his reasons for 21
7
any legitimate portions of the Act.
B. Justice Alito's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Alito agrees that Act 64's expenditure and contribution
restrictions are constitutionally flawed. 218 However, the Government's

secondary request-that the Court "revisit Buckley"-was not supported by
any argument as to why the doctrine of stare decisis should be scrapped for
this case. 219 Furthermore, Justice Alito points out that the respondents

indeed rely on Buckley as support for Act 64's contribution limits. 220 Thus,

by extension, the Court would have to reconsider only part of the Buckley
holding, the part relating to FECA's expenditure limitations. 22 This is a

Contra Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 468-70 (finding many politicians have run effective campaigns
on low budgets).
214. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2499 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e have found nowhere in the record any
special justification that might warrant a contribution limit so low or so restrictive as to bring about
the serious associational and expressive problems that we have described .... The record contains
no indication that, for example, corruption (or its appearance) in Vermont is significantly more
serious a matter than elsewhere.").
215. See id. at 2499-500. This is reminiscent of strict scrutiny, yet in the context of contribution
limits. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-60 (1990) (strict
scrutiny analysis applied to independent expenditure limits by determining whether the statute was
narrowly tailored to complete its objective). Even though the Court endorses its own ability to
decide what limits are appropriate (i.e., how much is too much), and fails to declare an exact
standard, the Court attempts to eliminate some ambiguity by delineating the five-factor test. See
Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2494-2500.
216. See generally Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2494-500 (plurality opinion).
217. See id. at 2500. To decide otherwise, he recognizes, would be "writ[ing] words into the
"
statute (inflation indexing), or... leav[ing] gaping loopholes (no limits on party contributions) ....
Id. Suggesting the legislature would be the better forum for this, Justice Breyer invites Vermont's
lawmakers to remedy the Act's deficiencies in accordance with the plurality's opinion and the First
Amendment's mandates. Id.
218. Id. at 2500 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
219. Id. Justice Alito argues that the Government's call for Buckley to be overturned was read
into its brief, Id. In fact, it was only a "backup argument, an afterthought almost." Id. This raises
the question of why Justice Breyer would delve so deeply into the issue. His judicial overreaching
might be more controversial if he had decided to overrule Buckley. However since he did not, it is
reasonable to postulate that he had ulterior motives, including a desire to respond to critics of the
Court's reliance on a case with such amorphous standards.
220. Id. (indicating that these "incongruous" assertions do not amount to a colorful claim for
reconsideration of Buckley).
221. Id. ("[R]espondents fail to explain why it would be appropriate to reexamine only one part of
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partial examination the Justice is unwilling to perform and, in any event, he
feels the Court should not even
reach the issue because of the Government's
222
"incomplete presentation."
C. Justice Kennedy's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Kennedy is a skeptic when it comes to the Court's entire body of
campaign finance law. 223 Thus, although he agrees with the determination

that both limitations are unconstitutional, he feels it is suitable for him to
only concur in the judgment.2 4 Justice Kennedy supports the plurality's
application of a higher level of scrutiny to expenditure limitations given the
nature of the restrictions on political expression. 225 However, he questions
the "unduly lenient review" the Court has frequently applied to contribution
limits, and asserts that Vermont's limits are "even more stifling" than others
that have endured the Court's review.226
D.

Justice Thomas's ConcurringOpinion

Justice Thomas elects to only concur in the judgment because of his
belief that the Court's application of its hybrid standard of review is
misguided, at best. 227 In arguing that Buckley provides inadequate protection

the holding in Buckley .... [R]espondents fail to discuss the doctrine of stare decisis or the Court's
cases elaborating on the circumstances in which it is appropriate to reconsider a prior constitutional
decision.").
222. Id. at 2500-01.
223. Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring only in the judgment) (recognizing his "own skepticism
regarding that system and its operation").
224. Id.
225. See id.; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 405-06 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court in Shrink "perpetuates and compounds a serious distortion of the
First Amendment resulting from our own intervention in Buckley," and that it "is concerned about
voter suspicion of the role of money in politics[, but a]midst an atmosphere of skepticism, however,
it hardly inspires confidence for the Court to abandon the rigors of our traditional First Amendment
structure"). Justice Kennedy recognizes that the Court has upheld contribution restrictions that do
"'not come even close to passing any serious scrutiny,"' but that Vermont's limits are significantly
more restrictive than those. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring only in the
judgment) (quoting Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 410 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
226. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring only in the judgment). The Justice
furthermore criticizes the part of the framework that requires the Court to play a numbers
game-that is, "to explain why $200 is too restrictive a limit while $1,500 is not." Id. As a result of
the Court's willingness to participate, he believes that political parties have been denied fundamental
First Amendment rights. Id. In light of this contested history, Justice Kennedy prefers to distance
himself from the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence. Id.
227. See id. at 2501-02 (Thomas, J., concurring only in the judgment); see also Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976).

to political expression, he boldly asserts that strict scrutiny should be the rule
of the day.228 He would overrule Buckley and its bipartite classifications,
eliminating the amorphous standards applied to each.229 Instead, Justice
Thomas asserts, the Court should view both expenditure and contribution
limits as equally severe restrictions on the freedoms of speech and
association. 230 He further declares that in the face of the strict scrutiny that
should be applied, all of Act 64's limitations are unconstitutional.231
Furthermore, Justice Thomas finds that the basis for Justice Breyer's
cultivation of "danger signs" is entirely nebulous and therefore
"constitutionally problematic. 232 With a hint of disdain, he criticizes Justice
Breyer's "newly-minted, multifactor test," which improperly allows the
Court to determine the suitability of statutory amounts "based upon little
more than its impression of the appropriate limits.,

233

The crux of his

228. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring only in the judgment) ("I continue to
believe that Buckley provides insufficient protection to political speech, the core of the First
Amendment.").
229. Id. Justice Thomas is highly critical of the Court's inability to articulate consistent standards
and apply them in a "coherent and principled fashion." Id. Unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Thomas
has no qualms about dispensing with long-existing precedent. See id. Justice Thomas believes that
the Court erred in Buckley, and he subsequently wrote several dissenting opinions expressing his
distaste for the Court's approach. See, e.g., FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
(Colorado 11),
533 U.S. 431, 465-66 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410-418 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. FEC (Colorado 1), 518 U.S. 604, 635-44 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas would not have distinguished between contribution and
expenditure limitations when performing his constitutional analysis, because he "believe[s] that
contribution limits infringe as directly and as seriously upon freedom of political expression and
association as do expenditure limits." Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 640 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part).
230. Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring only in the judgment). Justice Thomas
adds: "Buckley's suggestion that contribution caps only marginally restrict speech, because '[a]
contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not
communicate the underlying basis for the support,' even if descriptively accurate, does not support
restrictions on contributions." Id. (citations omitted). Indeed, "statements of general support are as
deserving of constitutional protection as those that communicate specific reasons for that support."
Id.
231. Id. Justice Thomas disapproves of the form of limited scrutiny applied in Buckley, and
contrary to the plurality, would not give it staredecisis effect. Id. at 2503. In fact, he condemns the
plurality's entire scheme as an unworkable approach. Id.
232. Id. at 2504. Here, Justice Breyer is accused of basing his "danger signs" on "a moving
target." Id. at 2503-04. For example, his comparison of Act 64 to other states' provisions creates,
rather than a workable standard, a target that will change as various states modify their laws. Id.
Thus, if another state that has higher limits than Act 64 lowers its allowable contributions, then,
suddenly, Act 64 would be constitutional under the plurality's approach. Id.
233. Id. This then begs the question: How much is too much, and who decides? Justice Thomas
argues that the plurality engages in an "odd review" of contribution restrictions and requires the
assimilation of "unrelated factors." Id. This criticism is at the root of his desire to uproot Buckley
and create a new, workable standard. See id. at 2501-04. He discounts two of Justice Breyer's
factors as wholly irrelevant to the "closely drawn" analysis, and then accuses the Court of the faulty
application of another. Id. at 2503-04. With the remaining two factors the only ones left to render
the contribution limits impermissible, Justice Thomas explains why both are poor justifications. Id.
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argument is that Justices of the Court are not qualified
to draw the line
234
between which limits are acceptable and which are not.

Despite his scathing critique of the plurality's opinion, Justice Thomas
makes clear that Justice Breyer gets it right when he concludes that the Act's
limits are impermissibly low-even235though Justice Breyer's result is reached
under Buckley's "lenient standard.,
E. Justice Stevens's DissentingOpinion
Although giving credence the considerations of stare decisis, Justice
Stevens would choose to overrule Buckley and hold that reasonable
limitations on campaign expenditures should be allowed.236 Relying on
Buckley's own disturbance of sixty-five years of settled precedent, which
had allowed limits on both expenditures and contributions, Justice Stevens
expresses his view that these limits are quite plausibly regulations of conduct
and not of speech. 237 Further still, he points out that Buckley's holding on
contribution limits has consistently been tested and upheld, but that stare
238
decisis has yet to be explicitly applied to its holding on expenditures.
Justice Stevens additionally opines that while the federal and state

at 2505.
234. Id. "Certainly, the First Amendment does not authorize us to judge whether a restriction of
political speech imposes a sufficiently severe disadvantage on challengers that a candidate should be
able to complain . . . .Courts have no yardstick by which to judge the proper amount and
effectiveness of campaign speech." Id. (quoting Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. 377, 427 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)).
235. Id. at 2506. Indeed, an effective quid pro quo arrangement would be hard to come by for the
low prices set by Act 64. See id.(stating that "it is almost impossible to imagine that any legislator
would ever find his scruples overcome by a $201 donation"). He also recognizes that these limits
severely impose upon the abilities of candidates to fund competitive campaigns. Id. Nevertheless,
Justice Thomas views the plurality's feeble attempt to draw a constitutional line as unprecedented
and irrational. See id. "Buckley provides no consistent protection to the core of the First
Amendment, and must be overruled." Id.
236. See id.at 2506-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believes that while stare decisis
is important, "it is not an inexorable command." Id. at 2507. Note, however, that Buckley didn't
actually hold that the government could never assert sufficient compelling interests that would
justify expenditure limits. Id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
237. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2507 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16
(stating that the Court could not "share the view that [FECA's] contribution and expenditure
limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O'Brien .... Some forms of
communication made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone . ...
[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of
money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required
by the First Amendment").
238. Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2507-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

legislatures have relied on Buckley in enacting contribution limits,
they have
2 39
not so relied on the Court's rejection of expenditure regulations.
To buttress his own position, Justice Stevens's references Justice

White's similar resistance to this part of Buckley's holding.2 40 The latter's
view was that it was "wrong to equate money and speech," and that
spending limits created only indirect burdens on political speech.241 He
asserts that the mild effects that such limits do have on speech are
viewpoint-neutral.242 Piggybacking on this approach, Justice Stevens says
he would uphold expenditure limitations under the same premise. 43 He then
engages in a metaphorical discussion-though the metaphors exploited are
more convenient than logical.244
In addition to Act 64's stated objective-that is, to prevent corruptionJustice Stevens endorses two complementary governmental interests: that of
providing equal political opportunities for the rich and poor, and that of

preventing candidates from spending egregious amounts of time raising
money.245

Consistent with his metaphorical theme, the Justice likens the

239. Id. at 2508.
240. Id.
241. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 263 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
This may not be realistic, however, as media is a common vehicle for candidate speech and must be
purchased at an often considerable price. Certainly, at least in the campaign context, speech serves
little or no purpose when it cannot be heard. Justice Stevens alternatively argues that "these limits
on expenditures are far more akin to time, place, and manner restrictions .... " Id.; see also
Colorado II, 518 U.S. 638-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "[e]ven in the case of a direct
expenditure, there is usually some go-between that facilitates the dissemination of the spender's
message" so the line between direct and indirect communication is somewhat blurred).
242. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2508 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I would uphold them 'so long as the
purposes they serve are legitimate and sufficiently substantial."' (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at
264)).
243. Id.
244. See id. Justice Stevens distinguishes a car without fuel from a candidate without money. Id.
("[W]hile a car cannot run without fuel, a candidate can speak without spending money.").
However, his analogy fails because candidates-at times-can also not speak without money. Id. If
a candidate cannot pay to advertise his speaking engagement, then this is arguably an abridgment of
speech. Justice Stevens fumbles this metaphor because venues where speeches are given necessarily
cost money. When the Justice says that "there is no limit on the number of speeches or interviews a
candidate may give on a limited budget," he loses a modicum of credibility. See id. A candidate
cannot control who will be willing to interview him. In fact, this is precisely the reason why a
challenger buys commercials-because he may not have the same access to the media as an
incumbent or an actor-turned-politician. Next, Justice Stevens uses the examples of Abraham
Lincoln and John F. Kennedy, neither of whom "paid for the opportunity to engage in the debates
with Stephen Douglas and Richard Nixon that may well have determined the outcomes of
Presidential elections." Id. at 2509. But who would have listened to these people if they had not
been widely-known before they entered into these cost-free debates? What came before these
debates was likely the expenditure of money. See Kenneth Jost, Campaign Finance Reform, 6 C.Q.
RESEARCHER 121, 129 (1996) (revealing that former President John F. Kennedy spent roughly $10
million during his 1960 presidential campaign).
245. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2509 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "When campaign costs are so
high ... we fail 'to protect the political process from undue influence of large aggregations of capital
and to promote individual responsibility for democratic government."' Id. (quoting United States v.
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latter to freeing candidates and their staffs from "the fundraising
Furthermore, Justice Stevens does not believe that
straitjacket., 246
expenditure ceilings favor incumbents.24 7 Until a careful study is completed,
he would defer to legislative determinations of how much is too much with
which to run a corruption-free campaign.248
F. Justice Souter's DissentingOpinion
Justice Souter's conclusion stands in stark contrast to that of the
plurality. Justice Souter wants the case remanded to determine whether Act
64's expenditure limits do in fact comport with First Amendment
guarantees. 249 He argues that Buckley did not "categorically foreclose" all
reasonable spending limits. 250 Thus, the Act's expenditure provisions should
have been fully analyzed under the appropriate level of exacting scrutiny.25 '
Because the Buckley Court's treatment of the Government's newest
justification was overly cursory, Justice Souter wants Vermont's statute
examined in light of this interest and its associated legislative findings. 2

UAW-CIO (Automobile Workers), 352 U.S. 567, 590 (1957)). Indeed, "[s]tates have recognized this
problem .....Id.
246. Id. at 2509. Justice Stevens calls it a "fundraising straitjacket," but then ignores how he
might instead be imposing an "expenditure straitjacket." See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 311-12.
Because of the higher threshold required to render expenditure limits valid, federal and state
governments generally only regulate contributions to a candidate, not his expenditures. Id. at 311.
The natural result is that politicians must reach large amounts of donors to compensate for the
monies they are not able to collect from wealthy donors and political parties. See id. at 312. This
requires a candidate to spend large portions of his time fundraising, at the expense of attention to
other political issues. See id. (recognizing that this would not "be necessary under a system
permitting reliance on venture capital from a few fat cats"). Indeed, much of his contact with
constituents will be asking for money. Id. Regardless, Justice Stevens urges that states be given the
opportunity to test expenditure limits, and thus determine how they, in practice, affect incumbents.
See Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2510 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247. See Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2509 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf, supra note 198.
dissenting).
248. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2510 (Stevens, J.,
249. See id. at 2511 (Souter, J., dissenting). This was a similar stance taken by the Second
Circuit, which remanded to the district court to "decide whether Vermont's spending limits are the
least restrictive means of accomplishing what the court unexceptionably found to be worthy
objectives." Id. at 2512 (referring to Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004)).
250. See id. at 2511; see also Landell, 382 F.3d at 107 ("Although the clear language of Buckley
requires that courts should review expenditure limits with exacting scrutiny, the District Court in this
case (and it is by no means alone) apparently felt that Buckley categorically prohibits expenditure
limitations. We disagree." (citations omitted)).
251. Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
252. Id. (noting that "[w]hatever the observations made to the Buckley Court about the effect of
fundraising on candidates' time, the Court did not squarely address a time-protection interest as
support for the expenditure limits, much less one buttressed by as thorough a record as we have
here"). Randall boasts a more complete record than Buckley, and Justice Souter argues that this new

Moreover, Justice Souter is persuaded that the Act's contribution limits
satisfy the mandates of the First Amendment." 3 Because there is no
constitutional minimum to which the Court must adhere, and because
Vermont's limits are not "remarkable departures" from past precedent,
Justice Souter favors judicial deference in this instance.254 He points out that
the record is replete with facts and testimony on the subject of corruption
and its correlate, public suspicion. 5 Justice Souter accuses the plurality of
making its decision based upon an unfounded, albeit implied assertion-that
Vermont legislators, as incumbents themselves, "cannot be trusted to set fair
limits.,,2 56 He does, however, clarify that he is not an advocate of absolute
deference and that he can, of course, "imagine dollar limits that would be
In the end, the Justice believes that Act 64's contribution
laughable ....
limits are constitutionally sound and would, against the plurality, uphold
them. 8
VI. IMPACT OF THE RANDALL V. SORRELL DECISION

Essentially, the Buckley legacy continues. 2 59 While the framework
established in 1976 has been criticized by legal scholars and Justices of the
Court, it has made one thing (and only one thing) clear: it has staying

"time-protection" interest must be addressed in light of the associated record. Id. Note that the
Justice does not say which way the case should turn out on remand, just that "the evidentiary work
that remained to be done would have raised the prospect for a sound answer to that question,
whatever the answer might have been." Id. at 2512.
253. Id. at 2512 ("Low though they are, one cannot say that 'the contribution limitation[s are] so
radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice
below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless." (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000)) (brackets in original)).
254. Id. at 2512-13 ("Vermont is not an eccentric party of one.").
255. Id. at 2513 (discussing the legislative findings regarding politicians who grant special access
and give generally better treatment to donors over non-donors).
256. Id. at 2514; see also id.at 2499 (plurality opinion) (making the argument that incumbents
will be less likely to amend Act 64 to compensate for the no-inflation problem). Justice Souter takes
dissenting). The first,
issue with four other facets of the plurality opinion. Id. at 2515 (Souter, J.,
that volunteer expenses will count against the volunteer's contribution limit, is regarded by him as
having only little significance in Act 64's overall scheme. Id. Second, Justice Souter finds that the
lack of an inflation-indexing feature holds even less clout. Id. Third, equal application of the Act's
contribution limits to both political parties and individuals effectively prevents wealthy citizens from
circumventing these limits by rerouting funds through political parties. Id. Finally, the Justice is
satisfied that the presumption of coordinated expenditures applied to certain party disbursements will
not have the effect of "chilling speech." Id. This is because, he asserts, the statute merely imposes a
burden of production, and thus a presumption more easily rebuttable than the burden of persuasion.
Id.
257. Id. at 2514.
258. Id. at 2516.
259. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (plurality opinion) (embracing the unequal treatment of
contribution and expenditure limits and applying Buckley to its fullest extent, although reaching a
different decision on the validity of campaign contributions); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).

202
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power. 260 Although Buckley maintained the status quo, future implications
for campaign finance are three-fold and mutually exclusive: (1) the Buckley
framework will live on to be misapplied by courts and to serve as a source of
confusion for practicing lawyers and law students; 26' (2) the distinction
between contributions and expenditures will be eliminated, and both types of
restrictions will be granted fortified First Amendment protections; 262 or (3)
the distinction between contributions and expenditures will be eliminated,
but both will be constitutionally regulated. 63 Depending on the political
view that one espouses, one of the last two options will generally be
preferred. 264 For those inclined to see consistency in the threads of First
Amendment jurisprudence, the first is fatally flawed.
Until five Justices hold a vision more consonant with one of the unitary
analyses proposed above, the debate about money as speech will continue to
be characterized negatively by critics. Indeed, several members of the Court
have expressed restlessness when addressing campaign finance restrictions

260. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2488 (plurality opinion) ("Over the last 30 years, in considering
the constitutionality of a host of different campaign finance statutes, this Court has repeatedly
adhered to Buckley's constraints .... ").
261. See, e.g., Citizens for Clean Gov't v. City of San Diego, 474 F.3d 647, 649-51 (9th Cir.
2007) (applying Buckley to contribution limits in the context of the signature-gathering phase of a
recall election; also citing Randall); see also Hayward, supra note 6, at 202-03. As the application
of Buckley ensues, the complexity of the cases seems to increase. Id. at 212. In the context of
campaign contributions, the trend will be for the Court to hear cases similar to Randall, but with
somewhat differing facts of course. Id. If Randall and Buckley are followed, then contribution
limits will continue to receive a lower level of scrutiny, requiring a more fact-intensive analysis. Id.;
see also Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2495-98. The continued application of Buckley has been reasoned to
be a result of "inertia." See also Sullivan, supra note 4, at 313. Indeed, that seems an appropriate
characterization of Randall, as the Court relied so heavily on Buckley and was coming off of several
years of cases doing the same. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134 (2003); FEC v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado 11), 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado
1), 518 U.S. 604, 610 (1996) (plurality opinion).
262. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 313. Essentially, this would require a partial overruling of
Buckley. The portion that found contribution limits constitutional would have to be reevaluated, as
the Court declined to do in Randall. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2489-90 (plurality opinion). Justice
Thomas has at least twice indicated that he would have gone in this direction if the majority would
extend the opportunity. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 313 (citing Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 638
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)); see also Randall, 126 S. Ct. at
2501-05 (Thomas, J., concurring only in the judgment).
263. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 314. This approach would essentially require the Court to
overrule Buckley's ban on expenditure limits. Id. At the same time, the Court would probably be
inclined to expand the accepted rationales. Id. Congress and the state legislatures would
consequently be given the power to regulate, in addition to time, place, and manner restrictions,
expenditure and contribution limits in the context of election fundraising. Id.
264. See Batchis, supra note 38, at 43-46 (discussing Buckley's "muddled jurisprudential
landscape").
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under the Buckley framework.265 However, each decision entails much of
the same: bifurcation of the approach, reliance on Buckley, some evidentiary
analysis, and strongly-worded dissenting opinions.266 In Randall, Justice

Breyer articulated a five-pronged analysis for the campaign contribution
context, and it remains to be seen whether the test will be well-received.267

While these factors might help bring greater clarity to the "how much is too
much" (or too little) determination, the supreme dilemma is the current
bipartite treatment of campaign regulations.
In any event, the FEC will continue to promulgate rules in accordance
with the provisions of the BCRA that were upheld in McConnell.2 6' Table 1
provides the latest examples of acceptable contribution limits. While the
states are ultimately sovereign in their regulation of state elections, all
campaign finance restrictions must be upheld under the same Constitution. 269
Thus, the Table provides an illustrative guide for current and future

constitutional limits. At first glance, Justice Breyer would be pleased: the
amounts are indexed for inflation.27 °

Table 1: 2007-2008 Federal Contribution Limits

27 1

265. See Hayward, supranote 6, at 214-15.
266. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134; Colorado I1, 533 U.S. at 441; Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at
386; Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 610 (plurality opinion); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),
479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm. (NPAC), 470 U.S.
480, 491 (1985); Cal. Med. Ass'n. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1981) (plurality opinion).
267. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2495, 2500 (plurality opinion).
268. See generallyMcConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
269. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
270. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2499 (plurality opinion) (taking issue with Act 64's non-indexed
contribution limits and discussing as one of five factors).
271. Press Release by FEC Announcing Updated Contribution Limits (Jan. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2007/200701231imits.html. As per the Bipartisan Campaign Finance
Reform Act of 2002, the Federal Election Commission indexes some contribution limits for
inflation. Id. The limits in Table I were effective beginning January 1, 2007 (or, for limits on
contributions from individuals to candidates, the day after each last general election ended), and are
applicable to elections for President, U.S. Senate, and U.S. House of Representatives. Id.
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To each
candidate
or
candidate
committee
per election

Individual
contribution
limit

To national
party
committee
per
calendar
year

To state,
district &

To any
other

local party
committee
per calendar
year

political
committee
per
calendar
year
year

$2,300

$28,500

$10,000
(combined)

$5,000

Committee
contribution
limit

$5,000

No limit

No limit

$5,000

State, District &
Local Party
Committee
contribution
limit

$5,000
(combined
limit)

National Party

Special
limits

$108,200
overall
biennial
limit:
$42,700 to
all
candidates
+ $65,000
to all PACs
& parties
$39,000 to
Senate
candidate
per
campaign

No limit

No limit

$5,000

No limit

$5,000

No limit

Multicandidate
PAC
contribution
limit

$5,000

$15,000

(combined
limit)

Nonmulticandidate
PAC
contribution
limit

$2,300

$28,500

$10,000
(combined
limit)

$5,000

No limit

Candidate
Committee may
contribute

$2,000

No limit

No limit

$5,000

No limit

$5,000

On a societal level, Randall v. Sorrell will not have a tremendous
impact, given that it merely reiterated what the Court has "repeatedly
adhered to." 272 However, the BCRA's amendments to FECA remain in
force, and as such, affect ordinary individuals, corporations, candidates,
parties, and others.273 The greater impact is on legal scholars, who continue
to grapple with the aftermath of Buckley.
VII. CONCLUSION
While campaign finance jurisprudence has its blunders, it also makes for
an interesting case study. With its decision in Randall v. Sorrell, the
Supreme Court remains in charted waters. Where, as here, an Act dips
below the radar, the Court will continue to determine important
constitutional questions: How much is too much to allow before the risk of
corruption materializes? How much is too little with which to run an
And who should decide, the judiciary or the
effective campaign?
legislature?
Finally, a rather tactless statement made by former Congressman
Richard Gephardt encapsulates the confusion--or perhaps the general
pessimism-of campaign finance reform: "What we have is two important
for healthy
values in direct conflict: freedom of speech and our desire
274
campaigns in a healthy democracy. You can't have both.,
Natalie A. Rainforth
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272. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2488 (plurality opinion).
273. See generally BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
274. Nancy Gibbs, The Wake-up Call, TIME, June 24, 2001, available at http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,137205,00.html.
275. J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine School of Law, May 2008; Bachelor of Science, Cognitive
Science with An Emphasis in Neuroscience, Minor in Political Science, University of California at
San Diego, December 2004. Sincerest gratitude and thanks to Michael L. Rainforth and Professor
Steven M. Schultz, two people of the highest character and integrity.
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